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  INTRODUCTION 
In adjudicating claims for relief, courts often proceed as fol-
lows: First, they ask whether a violation of the law has oc-
curred. If so, they next ask whether they may furnish the re-
quested relief.1 The first part of the analysis looks to the 
domain of substantive law, which allocates rights and duties 
among legal entities in their dealings with one another.2 The 
second part of the analysis looks to the law of remedies, which 
tells courts when and how to provide redress for demonstrated 
legal wrongs.3 To obtain its requested relief, then, a litigant 
must show both that the substantive law has been breached 
and that remedial law authorizes the form of relief being 
sought.4
 
 1. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 1 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 154 (1803) (ask-
ing first, “[h]as the applicant a right to the commission he demands?” and ask-
ing second, “[i]f he has a right and that right has been violated, do the laws of 
his country afford him a remedy?”). 
 
 2. A more complete list might also include powers, liabilities, liberties, 
no-rights, and other variations. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental 
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 716–66 
(1917). Unless otherwise indicated, I will use the term “rights” as a sort of 
shorthand for the broader set of substantive entitlements that individuals and 
government actors might hold against one another. 
 3. See, e.g., Marbury, 1 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 154. Modern opinions need not 
(and do not) always follow this order when issuing a denial of relief. See, e.g., 
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 230–36 (2009) (permitting judges to depart 
from merits-first adjudication in constitutional tort proceedings). When and to 
what extent judges should engage in merits-first analysis (as opposed to other 
forms of “decisional sequencing”) is a subject of rich debate. See, e.g., Peter B. 
Rutledge, Decisional Sequencing, 62 ALA. L. REV. 1, 1–54 (2010) (discussing 
the effect of sequencing rules on judicial decisionmaking). That debate, howev-
er, lies beyond the scope of this analysis. For purposes of this Article, it suffic-
es to note that courts tend to treat substantive and remedial questions as ana-
lytically distinct. 
 4. Throughout this Article, I use the term “remedies” to encompass a 
wide range of judicial actions that give practical effect to successful substan-
tive claims. In that sense, my definition of the term is roughly similar to what 
many other commentators have previously employed, cf. Samuel L. Bray, An-
nouncing Remedies, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 753, 757 (2012) (defining “remedy” in 
the “broad sense of anything awarded or imposed by a court”); Douglas 
Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161, 165 
(2008) (defining remedies as “the practical payoff” in litigation, which 
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As a formal matter, the law of remedies operates inde-
pendently of the substantive law. In expanding or contracting 
the availability of injunctions, declaratory judgments, damage 
awards, evidentiary exclusions, habeas corpus writs, and other 
forms of judicial remediation, courts do not purport to alter the 
rights and powers that the substantive law confers.5 Thus, for 
instance, a judicial denial of redress is not necessarily tanta-
mount to a judicial declaration that no wrongdoing occurred; 
courts can and do stay their remedial hand without signing off 
on the lawfulness of the conduct for which the remedy was 
sought. This is a basic feature of public law adjudication: What 
happens in remedial law stays in remedial law, or so we are 
told.6
As a functional matter, however, remedial law interacts 
with rights-based law in complex ways. Most evidently, legal 
remedies determine the efficacy of legal rights. A right without 
a remedy is like a ship without a sail—existent and identifia-
ble, but of limited practical use to its purported beneficiaries.
 
7
 
“[p]laintiff litigates to obtain” and “defendant litigates to avoid”). Somewhat 
less conventionally, I utilize the concept of a “remedy” in connection with both 
civil and criminal cases, treating monetary damages awarded to the plaintiff 
as just as much a “remedy” as the criminal sentence “awarded” to the victori-
ous prosecutor, or the suppression order “awarded” to the defendant prevailing 
on an evidentiary claim. Such an expanded definition of the term is some-
times, though not always, used in the legal literature. Compare Bray, supra, 
at 757 (limiting discussion to civil cases), and Laycock, supra, at 165 (charac-
terizing remedies as “the bottom line of any civil litigation”), with sources cited 
infra Part I.D–E (discussing “remedies” within the criminal context). To the 
extent there is variation here, I attribute it primarily to differing expositional 
choices, rather than an important conceptual disagreement.  
 
 5. See Laycock, supra note 4, at 166–67 (noting that “remedies are dis-
tinct from the underlying rules that regulate human conduct and impose lia-
bility”). 
 6. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983) (“The question 
whether the exclusionary rule’s remedy is appropriate in a particular context 
has long been regarded as an issue separate from the question whether the 
Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violat-
ed by police conduct.”). 
 7. See Laycock, supra note 4, at 165 (“A right with no effective remedy is 
unenforceable and largely illusory.”). That is not to say that legal entitlements 
unyoked to legal remedies can have no practical effects whatsoever. In some 
circumstances a bare substantive norm may suffice to induce compliance on 
the part of persons bound by it, regardless of whether a “remedy” comes along 
with it. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 57–70 (2006) (drawing 
on sociological research to suggest that individual compliance with criminal 
norms depends less on the sanctions attached to those norms and more on per-
ceptions of a legal system’s legitimacy); see also Samuel L. Bray, The Myth of 
the Mild Declaratory Judgment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1091, 1110–13 (2014) (observing 
that parties routinely obey declaratory judgment orders unaccompanied by 
Coenen_MLR  
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Court-ordered remedies operationalize the substantive law: 
they help to deter unlawful behavior, compensate victims of le-
gal wrongs, punish law-breakers, and in other ways vindicate 
the interests that substantive rules exist to promote. In this 
sense, diminished legal remedies yield weakened substantive 
protections, just as augmented legal remedies make substan-
tive protections more robust.8
A second sense in which substantive and remedial law in-
teract concerns not the enforcement of the substantive law, but 
rather the shaping of its content. For example, before ruling on 
the merits of a legal dispute, courts might anticipate the reme-
dial consequences of a legal violation, and having done so, be-
come more or less inclined to declare that a legal violation has 
occurred. Some scholars have suggested, for instance, that the 
exclusionary remedy deters the development of strong substan-
tive Fourth Amendment protections, as trial judges, loath to 
suppress damning evidence, find clever ways to declare that no 
constitutional violation ever occurred.
 
9
 
immediate sanctions for noncompliance, though attributing this phenomenon 
in part to the fact that such noncompliance can generate severe legal sanctions 
down the road). Even so, the central point remains: the absence of a remedial 
enforcement mechanism substantially diminishes the real-world value of a 
substantive legal norm.  
 Along similar lines, 
scholars have suggested that non-retroactivity rules facilitate 
the expansion of individual liberties by reducing the deterrent 
effect that the otherwise high cost of retroactive remediation 
would exert on judges contemplating changes in the substan-
 8. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equili-
bration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 887 (1999) (“[R]ights can be effectively en-
larged, abridged, or eviscerated by expanding, contracting, or eliminating 
remedies.”). 
 9. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 757, 799 (1994); Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 111, 112 (2003); see infra Part I.E; see also Steven M. Shepard, 
Note, The Case Against Automatic Reversal of Structural Errors, 117 YALE 
L.J. 1180, 1186–89 (2008) (suggesting that the high cost of automatic reversal 
remedy deters appellate courts from identifying constitutional criminal proce-
dure violations when reviewing trial court proceedings); Sonja B. Starr, Re-
thinking “Effective Remedies”: Remedial Deterrence in International Courts, 83 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 710–66 (2008) [hereinafter Starr, Rethinking Effective 
Remedies] (exploring connection between high-cost remedies applied by Inter-
national Criminal Tribunals and the shaping of international human rights 
law); Sonja B. Starr, Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial Mis-
conduct, 97 GEO. L.J. 1509, 1515–16 (2009) (identifying a similar phenomenon 
in connection with prosecutorial misconduct claims). See generally Levinson, 
supra note 8, at 889–99 (describing this phenomenon as “[r]emedial deter-
rence”). 
  
2014] SPILLOVER ACROSS REMEDIES 1215 
 
tive law.10 Remedial dynamics may affect rights-based law in 
subtler ways as well. They may, for instance, introduce selec-
tion biases into the pool of litigants who advance particular 
substantive claims.11 Or, perhaps, they may trigger cognitive 
biases within the judges evaluating these claims.12
 
 10. John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 
1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 79 (1998) [hereinafter Jeffries, Eleventh Amendment 
and Section 1983] (“Nonretroactivity facilitated the creation of new rights by 
reducing the costs of innovation.”); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy 
Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 98 (1999) [hereinafter Jeffries, 
Right-Remedy Gap] (suggesting that immunity rules in constitutional tort law 
“advance the growth and development of constitutional law”); see also Daniel 
B. Rodriguez, Of Gift Horses and Great Expectations: Remands Without 
Vacatur in Administrative Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599, 601 (2004) (criticizing 
courts’ use of “remand without vacatur” remedies in administrative law on the 
ground that the low-cost features of the remedy “facilitate[] the use of more 
aggressive judicial scrutiny of agencies’ reasoning process”). Professor Richard 
Fallon has articulated this basic insight in terms of what he calls the “Equili-
bration Thesis,” which holds that “justiciability, substantive, and remedial 
doctrines are substantially interconnected and that courts frequently face a 
choice about which doctrine to adjust in order to achieve acceptable results 
overall.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Rem-
edies—And Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 683 
(2006) [hereinafter Fallon, Linkage]; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the 
Right Questions About Officer Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 480 (2011) 
[hereinafter Fallon, Asking the Right Questions]. 
 Remedial 
fingerprints, simply put, lie all over the substantive law. Some-
times overtly, sometimes covertly, rules governing the redress 
 11. See, e.g., Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 474 
(2011) (documenting systematic bias in favor of patentability arising from “the 
asymmetric nature of appeals from the PTO to the Federal Circuit”); see also 
John M. Greabe, Objecting at the Altar: Why the Herring Good Faith Principle 
and the Harlow Qualified Immunity Doctrine Should Not Be Married, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 15 (2012) (noting potential substantive effects aris-
ing from the involvement of private insurance attorneys—rather than gov-
ernment attorneys—in representing defendants in constitutional tort suits); 
Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of 
the Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 (1990) (noting the 
possible existence of “a pro-defendant bias in the application and evolution of 
legal standards” resulting from the government’s inability to obtain reversals 
of acquittals in criminal cases). 
 12. Commentators have suggested, for example, that the exclusionary 
remedy triggers the application of “hindsight bias” in Fourth Amendment cas-
es, whereby judges’ ex post knowledge of a search’s results distorts their view 
of whether probable cause existed to conduct the search ex ante. See, e.g., 
Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 376, 403–04; William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth 
Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 912 (1991); see also Pamela S. 
Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 2001, 2019–22 (1998) (suggesting that hindsight bias might also prejudice 
appellate courts’ after-the-fact review of Batson claims asserted by defendants 
who were convicted in the court below). 
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of legal wrongs influence courts’ definitions of the legal wrongs 
themselves. 
This form of right-remedy interdependence has recently at-
tracted the attention of public law scholars. Their work has 
yielded valuable new insights on the age-old right-remedy dis-
tinction and has helped to underscore the importance of think-
ing carefully about the remedial environments from which sub-
stantive law emerges. Though varied in its evaluative 
approaches and prescriptive contributions, all of the scholar-
ship in this area adheres to the basic premise that remedy-
related variables affect not just the intensity with which sub-
stantive rights get enforced, but also the defining of substan-
tive rights themselves.13
Left largely unaddressed by this work, however, is a basic 
question: Is it bad for remedies to influence the shaping of sub-
stantive law and, if so, why? Consider, for instance, the argu-
ment that the exclusionary rule problematically “distorts” 
Fourth Amendment protections, by making judges hesitant to 
declare that searches violate the Constitution.
  
14
 
 13. Within individual fields, commentators have drawn attention to the 
linkage between remedial context and substantive law, and some commenta-
tors have proposed targeted responses to particular instances of the phenome-
non. See supra notes 
 Taken alone, 
this claim offers no meaningful criticism of the status quo. For 
one thing, it problematically assumes that courts would ever be 
capable of establishing such a thing as an “undistorted” set of 
Fourth Amendment protections. Unless we are prepared to call 
for the shaping of rights-based doctrine in a vacuum—
5–8 and accompanying text. More systematic examina-
tions of the phenomenon offer functional taxonomies of right-remedy 
relationships, exemplified by Professor Daryl Levinson’s work on the “equili-
bration” process that results from the transposition of remedial and substan-
tive rules. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 8, at 889–913; see also Fallon, Link-
age, supra note 10, at 654–88 (building on Levinson’s work to develop a 
general thesis regarding the interconnectivity of justiciability rules, substan-
tive law, and remedial law). In a related vein, Professor Nancy Leong has in-
vestigated the frequency with which different types of Fourth Amendment 
claims arise in different remedial contexts, while also advancing the thesis 
that courts produce higher quality law when they adjudicate substantive 
rights across multiple remedial environments. Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 
92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 421–75 (2012); see also infra Part II.C. Finally, Professor 
Jennifer Laurin has investigated the processes by which different remedial 
contexts shape the definition and implementation of criminal procedure rights, 
focusing in particular on ameliorating “language barriers” that materialize 
when courts attempt to enforce constitutional criminal procedure protections 
in civil cases. Jennifer E. Laurin, Rights Translation and Remedial 
Disequilibration, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1007 (2010). 
 14. See infra Part I.E. 
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uninfluenced by remedial considerations in every potential 
way—then we must concede that there is no such thing as a 
“pure” legal right for remedies to come in and corrupt. The 
harm of “distortion,” in other words, cannot lie in the mere fact 
that remedies influence rights; that is, after all, the fact whose 
harm we are attempting to discover. 
Perhaps, though, the “distortion” argument might go as fol-
lows: The problem with the exclusionary rule is not merely that 
it shapes Fourth Amendment doctrine, but that, relative to oth-
er potential remedies, it produces fewer judicial findings that 
Fourth Amendment violations have occurred. If we were to re-
place the exclusionary rule with a more lenient remedy—say, a 
small reduction in the defendant’s sentence15 or limited damag-
es liability against the offending public entity16—then courts 
would more often invalidate searches under the Fourth 
Amendment and thereby create a more expansive set of Fourth 
Amendment requirements. But even if that premise is true, civ-
il libertarians should not necessarily abandon the exclusionary 
rule. For, as we already noticed above, weakened remedies re-
duce the real-world effectiveness of the rights to which they at-
tach.17 (All else equal, for instance, the availability of the exclu-
sionary remedy is more likely to deter unlawful behavior than 
the prospect of a nominal damages award.) To evaluate the ex-
clusionary rule’s desirability from this perspective, the civil lib-
ertarian would have to ask whether courts will better safe-
guard Fourth Amendment freedoms by remediating violations 
more harshly but less frequently (i.e., with the exclusionary 
rule), or more frequently but less harshly (i.e., with a modest 
monetary sanction or another remedy of roughly equivalent le-
nience). That is an important question, to be sure, but it relates 
not so much to the “distortion” of Fourth Amendment law as it 
does to the question of how courts should mete out limited re-
medial capital across a range of cases.18
There is, however, a very real sense in which the exclu-
sionary rule might introduce “distortions” into substantive 
Fourth Amendment law. To see the problem, one must recog-
nize that Fourth Amendment claims sometimes accompany 
 
 
 15. See Calabresi, supra note 9, at 116–18.  
 16. See Slobogin, supra note 12, at 405–18. 
 17. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 18. To be clear, the point is not that such reform proposals are misguided; 
rather, it is that the reform proposals target something other than “distor-
tions” within the substantive law.  
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remedial requests other than a criminal defendant’s motion to 
suppress. Magistrate judges apply the Fourth Amendment 
when deciding whether to issue a warrant.19 Section 1983 cases 
present Fourth Amendment questions linked to requests for in-
junctions, damages, or declaratory relief.20 Fourth Amendment 
claims might even arise in criminal prosecutions under 18 
U.S.C. § 241.21
This particular problem—what I call the problem of spillo-
ver across remedies—is the focus of this Article. Several areas 
of substantive doctrine, I argue, have developed (or are at risk 
of developing) features that, while responsive to the demands of 
a single remedial environment, affect the law’s application 
within other such environments as well. Once embedded in the 
substantive law, a “remedy-specific” influence becomes part of a 
“cross-remedial” doctrine, destined to manifest itself within 
other remedial environments where it would not otherwise 
have taken hold. The spillover problem, in other words, arises 
as a consequence of two bedrock features of public law adjudi-
cation: (1) the inescapable intertwinement of substantive and 
remedial law; and (2) the generalized application of substantive 
law across multiple remedial settings. When one remedy affects 
the scope of a substantive rule, the cross-remedial nature of 
 These types of cases involve remedies very dif-
ferent from evidentiary exclusion. And yet, judges who decide 
these cases are bound by Fourth Amendment precedents that 
derive from suppression motions in criminal cases. Thus, when 
remedial dynamics unique to requests for suppression deter the 
finding of a Fourth Amendment violation, the effects of the 
holding threaten to spill over into other remedial settings in 
which the same right gets adjudicated. The distortionary harm, 
in other words, stems not just from the fact that remedies in-
fluence substantive law, but from the further fact that substan-
tive law applies across multiple remedial contexts. Formally 
speaking, we do not have different Fourth Amendment doc-
trines for § 1983 actions, suppression hearings, probable cause 
hearings, and so on. Instead, there simply is one Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, and it applies equally across these differ-
ent remedial contexts. Thus, when a particular remedial envi-
ronment influences the shaping of Fourth Amendment law, the 
alteration applies beyond its own remedial boundaries.  
 
 19. See generally Stuntz, supra note 12. 
 20. See, e.g., Leong, supra note 13, at 421–29. 
 21. See, e.g., United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910, 914–29 (D.C. Cir. 
1976). 
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that rule threatens to distort its development within other re-
medial settings.22
With the spillover problem thus acknowledged, the ques-
tion becomes how to deal with it. The central thesis of this Arti-
cle is that courts can best manage spillover through strategies 
of disaggregation, which vary the applicability of substantive 
rules across the different remedies used to enforce them.
 
23
 
 22. Individual examples of the spillover problem have not gone entirely 
unnoticed within the literature. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating 
Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 275–79 (2000); Laurin, supra note 
 Dis-
13, 
at 1007, 1032–34; Lawrence Solan, Statutory Inflation and Institutional 
Choice, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2209, 2211–81 (2003); Starr, Rethinking Effec-
tive Remedies, supra note 9, at 720–24. As best I can tell, however, no one has 
yet offered a systematic and transsubstantive analysis of the sort this Article 
seeks to provide. 
 23. I draw this term from the scholarship of Professor John Jeffries, who 
has advocated for “disaggregating” remedial rules of constitutional tort law 
across different categories of substantive claims. See Jeffries, supra note 22, at 
280 (“It is my contention that the liability rule for money damages should vary 
with the constitutional violation at issue.”). This Article advocates a sort of 
converse strategy, which disaggregates substantive rules of law across differ-
ent categories of remedies. I view these two projects as complementary rather 
than in tension with one another; both are part and parcel of a broader effort 
to “reject the radical dissociation of right and remedy immanent in current 
doctrine.” Id. at 281. Indeed, as I hope to demonstrate further in Part III, the 
disaggregation of rights across remedies is facilitated, rather than hindered, 
by the simultaneous disaggregation of remedies across rights. The two strate-
gies proceed along different paths, to be sure, but both paths are ultimately 
headed toward the same summit. 
Of related significance to this project is Professor Jennifer Laurin’s rich 
discussion of “rights translation” within the law of constitutional criminal pro-
cedure. In advocating for a process that permits certain “components” of a sub-
stantive rule to “shift in a new remedial context,” Laurin, supra note 13, at 
1007, Professor Laurin’s work may be read as endorsing limited forms of dis-
aggregation across civil-criminal boundaries. Her scholarship, however, does 
not focus specifically on the spillover problem, and it confines itself exclusively 
to the application of criminal procedure protections in civil and criminal cases. 
See, e.g., id. at 1004–07. I thus regard this project as complementary to Pro-
fessor Laurin’s work, as it seeks to bolster the case for the disaggregated law 
that a “rights translation” process might sometimes yield, while covering a 
more expansive set of substantive and remedial terrains. 
Finally, Professor Larry Sager’s “underenforcement thesis” bears mention 
in connection with this project, insofar as it advocates for a disaggregated def-
inition of judicially enforceable constitutional law on the one hand and consti-
tutional law (full stop) on the other. Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The 
Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 
1212–13 (1978). Without such disaggregation, as Professor Sager points out, 
institutional limitations specific to the judiciary might yield unnecessary cur-
tailments in the scope of substantive constitutional requirements that other 
institutional actors (such as legislators and executive officials) look to for 
guidance. Id. at 1213. This Article builds on Professor Sager’s thesis by sug-
Coenen_MLR  
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aggregation strategies attack spillover from the back-end. Ra-
ther than attempt to mitigate or eliminate the ways in which 
remedies affect rights, these strategies focus on confining rem-
edy-specific influences on rights to the particular remedial set-
tings in which they arise. If, for instance, we allow equal pro-
tection rules to differ based on whether a litigant seeks civil or 
criminal relief, considerations particular to the civil setting are 
less likely to influence courts’ resolution of criminal equal pro-
tection claims and vice versa. If Fourth Amendment rules differ 
according to whether a judge is considering a suppression mo-
tion ex post or a warrant application ex ante, influences specific 
to the former remedial context are less likely to interfere with 
the Fourth Amendment’s application in the latter. Simply put, 
the weaker the demand for cross-remedial uniformity, the 
weaker the threat of cross-remedial spillover. 
As it turns out, many areas of the law already pursue dis-
aggregation strategies of this sort. These strategies rely in par-
ticular on remedial exceptions, which limit the applicability of 
some (but not other) forms of relief associated with identical 
substantive claims.24 These exceptions help to reduce—albeit in 
indirect (and sometimes blunt) fashion—spillover across reme-
dies. Rules of qualified and absolute immunity, for instance, 
render constitutional rights more difficult to vindicate when 
raised as “offensive” swords against public actors (for example, 
via actions for injunctive or monetary relief) rather than “de-
fensive” shields in criminal prosecutions.25 Exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule remove some Fourth Amendment protections 
from the reach of criminal defendants at trial, even as those 
same protections might trigger the denial of a warrant applica-
tion, or the granting of monetary or injunctive relief in a civil 
proceeding.26
 
gesting that further disaggregation can and should occur within the category of 
judicially enforceable constitutional law, so as to prevent spillover from one 
remedial setting into another.  
 The harmless error rule creates a similar dispari-
 24. See infra Part III.A. 
 25. See MICHAEL L. WELLS & THOMAS A. EATON, CONSTITUTIONAL REME-
DIES: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, at xxii–xxiii 
(2002) (distinguishing between “[d]efensive, ‘shield-like’ remedies,” and “offen-
sive remedies”); Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitu-
tion as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1532 (1972) (contrasting between de-
fensive constitutional remedies, which employ the “sanction of nullification” of 
government imposed punishments, and offensive constitutional remedies, 
which seek “to use judicial power to force affirmative action”). 
 26. But see Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal 
Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 673, 688–721 (2011) 
  
2014] SPILLOVER ACROSS REMEDIES 1221 
 
ty between the broader set of procedural protections that are 
capable of yielding relief during trials and the narrower set of 
such protections that are capable of yielding reversals on ap-
peal.27 To be sure, exceptions such as these do not explicitly 
disaggregate the substantive law: as a formal matter, the same 
substantive claims—supported by the same substantive prece-
dents—are asserted and disposed of in these different remedial 
contexts, and to the extent that variations in outcomes arise, 
the variations remain attributable to formally remedial rather 
than formally substantive rules. From a functional perspective, 
however, remedial exceptions can (and often do) produce some-
thing very much like disaggregated substantive doctrine, as 
they render identical substantive rules more or less susceptible 
to vindication depending solely on the remedial context in 
which these rules are litigated.28
This is not to say, however, that remedial exceptions cur-
rently on the books have enjoyed unconditional success as anti-
spillover devices, and this Article thus goes on to propose ways 
in which courts might more effectively define and deploy these 
exceptions to perform this role. Generally speaking, the im-
provements I suggest involve making remedial exceptions more 
particularized and substance-specific. Rather than employ a 
small number of broad remedial exceptions—applicable across 
a wide range of substantive norms—courts should employ a 
larger number of narrower exceptions, targeting particularized 
combinations of substantive and remedial rules.
 A primary purpose of this Ar-
ticle, then, is to emphasize this virtue of remedial exceptions: 
By disaggregating the application of substantive norms across 
remedial boundaries, remedial exceptions substantially miti-
gate the problem of spillover across remedies.  
29
 
(identifying similarities between the Court’s exceptions to the exclusionary 
rule and its exceptions to § 1983 damages liability). 
 Pushed far 
enough in this direction, remedial exceptions might even start 
to lose their “remedial” character altogether, looking less and 
less like discrete carve-outs to otherwise uniform rules of re-
medial law, and more and more like hybridized rules of “right-
remedy” law, whose content depends on both the type of relief a 
litigant demands and the type of substantive claim she asserts. 
 27. Cf. Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 
VA. L. REV. 1, 26 (2002) (“Unless an appellate court determines that an error is 
prejudicial, the Court has no authority to remedy that error, by whatever 
means.”). 
 28. See discussion infra Part III. 
 29. See, e.g., discussion infra Part I.F. 
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That transformation would further increase both the appear-
ance and reality of cross-remedial variations in the substantive 
law, making, in effect, the disaggregating function of remedial 
exceptions more explicit and complete. 
These observations tee up the final question with which 
this Article grapples: Is disaggregation proper? For even if 
courts can best manage the spillover problem by varying sub-
stantive rights across remedial boundaries, overriding consid-
erations may nonetheless counsel against this approach. In 
particular, I confront four separate concerns that the disaggre-
gation strategy presents: (1) that it improperly ascribes multi-
ple definitions to substantive rules derived from a single textu-
al source; (2) that it creates overwhelming problems of 
administrability for courts and litigants; (3) that it undermines 
important rule-of-law values; and (4) that, with respect to a 
limited category of rights and remedies, it impedes higher-level 
courts’ ability to supervise the work of their lower-level coun-
terparts. While I acknowledge the validity of each of these con-
cerns, I conclude that none provides sufficient grounds for 
abandoning the disaggregation strategy altogether. 
Here, then, is the remaining plan of attack: Part I intro-
duces the spillover problem by offering examples from public 
law adjudication. Part II appraises a preliminary set of “non-
disaggregation” anti-spillover strategies, each of which aims to 
mitigate the spillover problem while maintaining uniform en-
forcement of substantive rules across remedial boundaries. For 
example, courts could attempt to alleviate spillover by forging 
rules of substantive law with all applicable remedial contexts 
in mind. Or they could reform remedial structures with an eye 
toward “equalizing” the influences that different remedial 
structures exert on the shaping of substantive rules. Or they 
could seek to expand the number of remedial settings in which 
a given substantive rule gets applied, with the hope that a “di-
versified” set of remedial inputs will ensure that no single rem-
edy predominates in affecting the content of a substantive rule. 
These anti-spillover strategies, I suggest, can preserve the for-
mal uniformity of substantive rules across different remedial 
contexts, but they ultimately provide inadequate solutions. We 
should therefore consider the alternative strategy of disaggre-
gating the substantive law according to different remedial de-
mands. 
Part III turns to the use of remedial exceptions to achieve 
disaggregation in the law. I first demonstrate how our current 
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palette of remedial exceptions already functionally disaggre-
gates the substantive law in a way that mitigates cross-
remedial spillover effects, and I then suggest ways in which 
courts might further improve these exceptions’ performance in 
combating spillover across remedies. Finally, Part IV offers a 
qualified defense of disaggregation within the substantive law, 
concluding that no overriding considerations should compel us 
to reject it categorically. 
One final caveat: Lest I be misunderstood, this Article is 
not intended to push for the total disaggregation of rights 
across remedies. I am not enthusiastic about reviving the com-
mon law writ system, along with its myriad forms of action 
governed by discrete, self-contained packages of procedural, 
substantive, and remedial rules.30
I.  CROSS-REMEDIAL SPILLOVER IN ACTION   
 Nor do I advocate for the to-
tal dissolution of the formal boundaries that separate “substan-
tive” from “remedial” law. Whatever the conceptual merits of 
the right-remedy distinction, it is a distinction around which 
the law has organized itself for quite some time, and it will re-
main a key organizing principle of the doctrine for years to 
come. I do not, then, propose a dramatic restructuring of doc-
trinal rules governing the judicial resolution of public law dis-
putes. Instead, I push for more modest improvements to cate-
gorization schemes already in effect. We can, I think, achieve 
more disaggregation of the law (and concomitantly less spillo-
ver across remedies) without going so far as to dissolve the cat-
egories of “right” and “remedy” altogether. How far down this 
road we should travel is a difficult question that I won’t purport 
to resolve here. But I do hope to suggest that there is room to 
move in that direction before needing to worry that we have 
gone too far.  
To help reveal how cross-remedial spillover happens, this 
Part sets forth some examples of the phenomenon in action. 
The examples span both constitutional and nonconstitutional 
 
 30. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY, 63–
83 (3d ed. 1990); see also Laycock, supra note 4, at 165 (“[R]emedies scholars 
start from a base of broadly applicable remedial principles. There is no reason 
to have a different law of damages, or a different law of injunctions, for each 
cause of action, as though we had never abandoned the writ system.”). While I 
agree with Professor Laycock that we should avoid wholesale reinstatement of 
the writ system, I do not view this question—or the related question of wheth-
er we should permit some variation of substantive rules across different reme-
dial environments—as presenting an all-or-nothing choice. 
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cases,31
In one sense, much of what follows should be familiar to 
students of the right-remedy relationship. Public law scholars 
have long been familiar with the ways in which remedy-specific 
variables can affect courts’ disposition of substantive claims, 
and many of the examples discussed below build on descriptive 
observations these scholars already have offered. What have 
received less attention, however, are the cross-remedial after-
shocks that follow from a particular remedy’s point of contact 
with a substantive rule. It is on these aftershocks that this Part 
seeks to shed new descriptive light.  
 and reveal two important points: (1) remedies can affect 
the definition of substantive rules in a variety of ways; and (2) 
substantive holdings shaped in one remedial context can ac-
quire precedential force within other remedial contexts as well. 
When these two things happen to the same substantive rule, 
spillover across remedies will occur. 
A. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS LAW AND MONETARY RELIEF 
UNDER § 1983 
In Paul v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that govern-
ment-inflicted harm to “reputation alone” did not trigger proce-
dural due process protections under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.32 This holding diverged from the Court’s earlier 
suggestion, in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, that due process re-
strictions applied whenever “a person’s good name, reputation, 
honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government 
is doing to him.”33 Though not purporting to overrule 
Constantineau,34 the Court in Paul made clear that stigmatic 
injuries alone could not give rise to procedural due process 
claims; instead, stigmatic injuries could support such claims 
only when the plaintiff could identify some other “more tangi-
ble” harm, such as the loss of employment or a specific business 
opportunity.35
 
 31. This Article’s focus on rights and remedies within the public (but not 
private) law context reflects only an expositional choice. I do not intend to 
communicate any deep point concerning the prevalence (or lack thereof) of 
analogous forms of spillover across private law remedies. 
 
 32. 424 U.S. 693, 695 (1976). 
 33. 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971). 
 34. Paul, 424 U.S. at 701–02. 
 35. Id. at 701.  
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Remedy-specific considerations, the Court made clear, fa-
vored its adoption of this “stigma plus” rule.36 In contrast to 
Constantineau, where the plaintiff sought to invalidate a Wis-
consin state statute via an injunction,37 Paul involved a de-
mand for monetary relief against individual police officers.38 
The officers had circulated a flyer to hundreds of local mer-
chants, with the names and photographs of supposedly “active 
shoplifters,” including the plaintiff, Davis.39 Having never in 
fact been convicted of shoplifting, Davis sued under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, which creates a civil cause of action for individuals who 
claim injury based on state-based actors’ violations of federal 
law.40 Specifically, Davis alleged that the officers’ circulation of 
the flyer violated his procedural due process rights, and he de-
manded compensation for the reputational harm he had suf-
fered.41 Paul thus resembled a garden-variety defamation suit, 
pigeonholed into a § 1983 action because of the public, rather 
than private, status of the allegedly defamatory actors. To the 
majority, this point mattered a great deal. If successful, the 
Court reasoned, the plaintiff’s suit would convert the Four-
teenth Amendment into a “font of tort law to be superimposed 
upon whatever systems may already be administered by the 
States.”42 And from the Court’s reluctance “to derive from con-
gressional civil rights statutes a body of general federal tort 
law,” it followed “[a] fortiori” that “the procedural guarantees of 
the Due Process Clause cannot be the source of such law.”43
The Paul majority marshaled other arguments in support 
of its “stigma plus” holding. But many commentators have sug-
gested that the “font of tort law” concern was the primary fac-
tor underlying Paul’s result.
 
44
 
 36. Id. at 730. 
 Simply put, the Supreme Court 
 37. See Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 435. 
 38. Paul, 424 U.S. at 696. 
 39. Id. at 695. 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 41. Paul, 424 U.S. at 696. 
 42. Id. at 701. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See, e.g., Barbara Armacost, Race and Reputation: The Real Legacy of 
Paul v. Davis, 85 VA. L. REV. 569, 576–77 & n.29 (1999) (“Many scholars have 
understood the Court’s holding to result in large part from the Court’s view 
that it could not permit the defamation claim in Paul without opening the door 
of the federal courts to a whole range of other tort-like claims involving depri-
vations of life, liberty, or property.”); Jeffries, supra note 22, at 277 (hypothe-
sizing that “Paul v. Davis is an example of the § 1983 tail wagging the consti-
tutional dog”); Levinson, supra note 8, at 893 (“In all likelihood, Paul would 
Coenen_MLR  
1226 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:1211 
 
did not want § 1983 to authorize defamation actions against 
public officials. But rather than render a decision about the 
reach of permissible damage remedies under § 1983, it chose to 
discuss the Due Process Clause instead. The upshot was the 
creation of rights-based law, applicable beyond the immediate 
remedial setting that Paul itself presented. Thus, as Professor 
Jeffries has pointed out, insofar as the Court in Paul chose to 
“limit[] liability by constricting rights,” its rights-based resolu-
tion of the case swept broadly across all other remedial con-
texts, “mean[ing] that injunctions, defenses, and other reme-
dies [were] also precluded.”45
And, indeed, since its adoption, the “stigma-plus” rule has 
applied in remedial settings that are quite different from what 
the Court confronted in Paul. Courts have grappled with the 
rule, for instance, when considering: (1) a corporation’s request 
 
 
have come out differently if the only available remedy had been an injunc-
tion.”). 
 45. Jeffries, supra note 22, at 289; see also Christina Brooks Whitman, 
Emphasizing the Constitutional in Constitutional Torts, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
661, 674 (1997) (“If the Constitution is held to be inapplicable where official 
misconduct looks too much like the subject of tort, other remedies will be fore-
closed as well.”). For another example of damages-induced spillover, consider 
Professor Jeffries’s discussion of County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 
(1998) in Jeffries, supra note 15, at 278. In Lewis, the Court confronted a 
§ 1983 action involving a high-speed police chase, in which a deputy sheriff’s 
allegedly reckless driving caused a fatal motorcycle crash. The Court denied 
§ 1983 damages to the parents of the crash victim (who asserted a substantive 
due process violation), on the grounds that the deputy sheriff did not actually 
intend to harm their son. (Reckless indifference or gross negligence, in other 
words, was simply not enough to create a deprivation of substantive due pro-
cess.) Lewis, 523 U.S. at 854.  
Professor Jeffries speculates that Lewis, like Paul v. Davis, was “another 
example of the prospect of monetary damages inducing a restrictive definition 
of the underlying right,” and that, while it is impossible to know for sure, the 
Court might have reacted differently to the Lewises’ claim had it arisen in 
“another remedial context.” Jeffries, supra note 22, at 278. If so, we need not 
look far for examples of the Lewis rule yielding spillover across remedies. 
Consider, for instance, the Second Circuit’s holding in Graziano v. Pataki, 
689 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam). There, the court denied injunctive 
and declaratory relief to a group of prisoners who alleged that they had re-
peatedly been denied parole for “arbitrary or impermissible reasons,” in viola-
tion of their substantive due process rights. Id. at 115. The court made short 
shrift of these claims, relying on the Supreme Court’s earlier proclamation in 
Lewis that “only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be ‘arbitrary 
in the constitutional sense.’” Id. at 116 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846). 
Graziano, however, arose in a remedial setting very different from the one the 
Court confronted in Lewis. Nevertheless, Lewis, whose holding derived largely 
from concerns about awarding damages relief, controlled the outcome of 
Graziano, a case where the prospect of damages relief was not on the table. Id. 
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for a declaratory judgment regarding the constitutionality of 
CERCLA-based regulatory procedures implemented by the 
EPA;46 (2) an attorney’s motion for a “name-clearing hearing” 
before a court that sharply criticized his conduct in a published 
opinion;47 (3) several cases in which litigants sought declaratory 
and/or injunctive relief concerning the constitutionality of 
state-law sex offender registration requirements;48 and (4) a re-
quest for an affirmative injunction mandating adoption of spe-
cialized procedural safeguards by a public commission tasked 
with investigating and accusing individuals of public bribery.49
 
 46. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110, 113–14, 116, 121–23 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010); see also Asbestec Constr. Services v. EPA, 849 F.2d 765, 769 (2d 
Cir. 1988) (“To mount such a challenge more than reputation alone must be at 
stake. . . . [T]his sort of allegation of defamation is actionable only when made 
in the context of a denial of . . . a government contract.” (citing Paul v. Davis, 
424 U.S. 693, 706 (1976))). 
 
Meritorious or not, these claims gave rise to remedial requests 
that in no way threatened to open the floodgates to common 
 47. United States v. Sigma Int’l, Inc., 300 F.3d 1278, 1279 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(en banc) (per curiam). 
 48. The cases here have gone both ways. Compare, e.g., Schepers v. 
Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 691 F.3d 909, 914 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that In-
diana’s state sex offender registry did implicate valid liberty interests under 
Paul, because placement on the registry “deprives [required registrants] of a 
variety of rights and privileges held by ordinary Indiana citizens”), and Cole-
man v. Dretke, 409 F.3d 665, 673 (5th Cir. 2005) (Jones, J., dissenting from 
the denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that a Fifth Circuit panel misapplied 
the law in a sex offender registry case, by “transforming the Paul v. Davis 
‘stigma-plus’ test into ‘plus=stigma’”), with Brown v. City of Michigan City, 
Ind., 462 F.3d 720, 729–30 (7th Cir. 2006) (upholding municipal sex offender 
ordinance on the ground that the city’s classification of the plaintiff as a “pre-
sent threat” to children, while certainly damaging to his reputation, could not 
“fulfill the ‘plus’ factor of the Paul v. Davis test”), Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 
1345 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Paul v. Davis for the proposition that a sex of-
fender statute did not offend any “fundamental right,” cognizable on substan-
tive due process grounds), and Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 644–45 (8th 
Cir. 2003) (rejecting a procedural due process challenge to a Minnesota sex of-
fender statute on the ground that the plaintiff failed to satisfy Paul’s “stigma-
plus” requirement). Some of the inter-circuit disagreement on this question 
was put to rest by the Supreme Court’s decision in Connecticut Department of 
Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003), where, rather than reach the question 
of whether a Connecticut sex offender statute was valid under Paul, the Court 
determined that the statute’s application turned solely on the existence of a 
past conviction, and that the existence of a conviction was “a fact that a con-
victed offender has already had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to 
contest.” Id. at 7. Yet even the post-Doe cases continue to grapple with Paul 
and its stigma-plus rule, see, for example, Schepers, 691 F.3d at 1216, even 
though many of these cases present nothing akin to a common-law tort action. 
 49. Aponte v. Calderón, 284 F.3d 184, 195–98 (1st Cir. 2002). 
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law tort-like litigation under the Due Process Clause.50 None-
theless, they all were decided by reference to a rule that 
emerged from worries about converting the Fourteenth 
Amendment into a “font of tort law”—law, in other words, that 
would routinely sustain claims for civil monetary relief.51
B. EQUAL PROTECTION LAW AND THE CIVIL/CRIMINAL DIVIDE 
 
A subtler example of the spillover problem involves the 
“discriminatory purpose” rule of Washington v. Davis.52 The 
plaintiffs in Davis sought an injunction against the D.C. Police 
Department, alleging that a screening examination for prospec-
tive employers violated constitutional equal protection re-
quirements.53 Because the Davis plaintiffs lacked direct evi-
dence of discriminatory intent, they based their claim on a 
showing of discriminatory impact—that is, on statistical evi-
dence that white applicants far more often passed the exam 
than their black counterparts.54 That showing was good enough 
for the D.C. Circuit, which found for the plaintiffs.55 But the 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that discriminatory effects 
could not establish a constitutional violation, unless accompa-
nied by a showing of discriminatory purpose.56
Animating the Court’s holding was a concern about the 
remedial consequences of a disparate impact rule. Such a rule, 
  
 
 50. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). 
 51. Id. 
 52. 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see also Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 
(1979) (holding that “even if a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse 
effect upon a racial minority, it is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection 
Clause only if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose”); Arling-
ton Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977) 
(“[O]fficial action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a 
racially disproportionate impact.”). 
 53. Washington, 426 U.S. at 229. 
 54. Id. at 237. 
 55. Washington v. Davis, 512 F.2d 956, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1975).  
 56. Washington, 426 U.S. at 230–31. As Professor Reva Siegel has noted, 
Washington v. Davis’s disparate impact rule was rendered even more restric-
tive by Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), which severely 
limited the evidentiary means by which litigants could prove discriminatory 
purpose. See Reva Siegel, The Supreme Court 2012 Term—Foreword: Equality 
Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2013) (noting that “Davis left open mul-
tiple evidentiary pathways to proving purpose,” and that “it was not until 
[Feeney] that the Court moved decisively to restrict the ways that evidence of 
foreseeable impact could be used to prove unconstitutional purpose”). Feeney, 
like Davis, was a civil case, involving a request for injunctive relief. 442 U.S. 
at 260. 
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as Justice White explained for the majority, “would be far 
reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps 
invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regula-
tory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to 
the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent 
white.”57 A more exacting standard was thus necessary to pre-
vent judicial meddling in these and other government opera-
tions.58 Indeed, as Professor Levinson has explained, invalidat-
ing the screening exam in Davis would have “invited, if not 
compelled” the Court “to address the underlying problem of ed-
ucational disadvantage, which might point toward massive 
structural reform of education.”59 And that, in turn, would have 
ultimately led the Court down a path without “any 
nonarbitrary stopping point for remedies short of the wholesale 
restructuring of the basic institutions of society to redistribute 
resources and power more fairly among racial groups.”60 This 
was, as Levinson has put it, “not the kind of project courts 
would be inclined (or allowed) to undertake.”61 And thus Davis’s 
discriminatory purpose requirement stemmed largely from “a 
concern with institutional limitations, going to remedies.”62
Subsequent cases have confirmed that Davis’s rejection of 
disparate impact liability under the Equal Protection Clause 
applies within other remedial contexts.
 
63
 
 57. Washington, 426 U.S. at 248. 
 Notably, the discrimi-
natory purpose rule applies with equal force in criminal cases, 
in which defendants seek not sweeping injunctions against gov-
ernment agencies, but defensive relief from the specific focus of 
government-imposed punishment. Until recently, for instance, 
federal drug crimes involving one gram of crack cocaine were 
punished just as harshly as drug crimes involving 100 grams of 
 58. Id. at 239–40. 
 59. Levinson, supra note 8, at 899.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Id.; Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punish-
ment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1414 (1988) (noting 
that the Davis Court “stated as an important justification [for its discriminato-
ry purpose requirement] the need to limit the intrusiveness of federal judicial 
remedies”). 
 63. Cf. David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 952–53 (1989) (“The more important aspect of Washing-
ton v. Davis . . . was the Court’s ruling that the discriminatory intent standard 
is a comprehensive account of what constitutes impermissible discrimination 
under the Equal Protection Clause.”); see also Seigel, supra note 56, at 50–51. 
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powder cocaine.64 The 100:1 ratio, though race-neutral on its 
face, exerted an obvious discriminatory impact on African-
Americans, who face far greater risks of prosecution on crack-
cocaine charges.65 Notwithstanding powerful statistical confir-
mations of this fact, Washington v. Davis and its progeny stood 
as an impenetrable barrier to equal protection relief, as black 
crack-cocaine defendants never managed to gather enough evi-
dence to satisfy the discriminatory purpose requirement.66
Perhaps the crack-cocaine sentencing regime does in fact 
reveal a discriminatory intent of the sort that Davis sought to 
police, or at least has such a massively disparate racial impact 
to raise a burden-shifting inference of such intent. The im-
portant question for our purposes, however, is whether courts 
in the criminal setting should even be applying the Davis rule 
at all. Two important differences between criminal and non-
criminal cases suggest that they should not. First, criminal 
cases implicate heightened liberty interests. “Locking someone 
up in cage for a period of years,” as Professor David Sklansky 
has put it, “is singularly serious business,” and that fact alone 
might justify a less “universalist” scheme of equal protection 
review across civil and criminal lines.
 
67 Justice White himself 
had pointed out in a pre-Davis decision that in criminal cases, 
“where the power of the State weighs most heavily upon the in-
dividual or the group, [courts] must be especially sensitive to 
the policies of the Equal Protection Clause.”68 Consequently, 
while the practical difficulties of remediation might be enough 
to justify tolerating discriminatory impact in connection with 
education, employment, and the disbursement of other gov-
ernment-provided benefits, the same might not be true when 
the government throws its citizens behind bars.69
 
 64. The ratio now stands at 18:1. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) 
(2012)). 
 
 65. See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1289 (1995). 
 66. See id. at 1303 & n.93 (citing cases for the proposition that “the [crack 
cocaine] defendants always have lost, and the opinions generally have been 
both unanimous and short”). 
 67. Id. at 1316. 
 68. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). 
 69. The Court would later flip this idea on its head, implying in McCleskey 
v. Kemp that, if anything, criminal cases necessitated a less rigorous set of 
equal protection requirements than Davis and its progeny had set forth. 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987). Emphasizing that “[o]ne of soci-
ety’s most basic tasks is that of protecting the lives of its citizens and one of 
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Second, the practical difficulties of equal protection reme-
diation may actually be easier to overcome in the criminal con-
text. In civil cases, equalizing treatment of whites and 
nonwhites often amounts to a zero-sum game, in the sense that 
court-ordered gains for nonwhites translate directly into court-
ordered losses for white beneficiaries of the status quo. Hiring 
more black police officers means hiring fewer white officers; re-
ducing de facto school segregation means reducing white en-
rollment in neighborhood schools; increasing welfare benefits 
for black recipients means decreasing benefits for white recipi-
ents; and so on. But with criminal sentencing schemes, courts 
can achieve improvements for nonwhite defendants without 
 
the most basic ways in which it achieves the task is through criminal laws 
against murder,” the Court in McCleskey rejected a statistical proffer of dis-
crimination in capital sentencing as insufficient to demonstrate purposeful 
discrimination. Id. (“Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice pro-
cess, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that 
the discretion has been abused.”). I share Professor Sklansky’s reaction to this 
reasoning: it reflects an “even starker illustration than the crack cases of the 
appalling blindness of our current approach to equal protection.” Sklansky, 
supra note 65, at 1317. Powerful as the state’s interest in preventing murder 
might be, that interest should not require courts to apply relaxed equal protec-
tion standards when reviewing capital sentences, which, even if invalidated, 
would leave states free to enforce its prohibitions on murder with the very se-
rious alternative sentence of life imprisonment. And when viewed against the 
fact that a capital sentencing determination implicates nothing less than the 
defendant’s interest in remaining alive, the McCleskey Court’s call for more 
equal protection deference to a state’s imposition of the death penalty (as com-
pared to the level of deference that would apply to, say, a state’s hiring prac-
tices or allocation of public benefits) seems to me bizarre and wrongheaded. 
See also McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 347–48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
the majority for giving a perverse “new meaning” to the notion that “death is 
different,” by “rel[ying] on the very fact that this is a case involving capital 
punishment to apply a lesser standard of scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause”). 
That being said, I also agree with Professor Sklansky that McCleskey’s 
questionable logic, even if accepted, should not extend to courts’ review of 
crack/cocaine sentencing disparities under federal law. For one thing, 
McCleskey’s holding derived in part from the Court’s desire not to intrude on 
sovereign states’ administration of their own criminal justice systems. Such 
concerns are wholly absent when a federal court reviews the constitutionality 
of a federal sentencing scheme. Sklansky, supra note 65, at 1317. Second, 
McCleskey’s result depended on the highly discretionary nature of the sentenc-
ing scheme that Georgia then employed, which made it especially difficult for 
courts to probe “the motives and influences” underlying any given capital ver-
dict. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 296; Sklansky, supra note 65, at 1317 n.174. The 
crack/cocaine laws, by contrast, “are part of a sentencing system that has in-
tentionally replaced broadly diffused discretion with a uniform and compre-
hensive set of rules,” thus making it practically more feasible to determine 
whether the scheme as defined infringes on a defendant’s equal protection 
rights. Sklansky, supra note 65, at 1317. 
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worsening the situation of their white counterparts, by reduc-
ing the sentences that are disproportionately experienced by 
one racial group while leaving unchanged the sentences that 
other defendants receive.70 This is not to say that promoting ra-
cial equality in the remedial context of criminal sentencing de-
terminations is a straightforward exercise. But at the very 
least, courts can engage in the enterprise without having to in-
flict direct costs on members of another racial group.71
What is notable about Washington v. Davis’s migration in-
to the criminal sentencing context is not simply that the migra-
tion occurred; it is that no court even seemed to notice, much 
less question, its occurrence.
 
72
 
 70. For a similar observation, applicable to claims of discriminatory pros-
ecution, see Yoav Sapir, Neither Intent Nor Impact: A Critique of the Racially 
Based Selective Prosecution Jurisprudence and a Reform Proposal, 19 HARV. 
BLACKLETTER L.J. 127, 138 (2003). 
 When the Court in Davis issued 
a cross-remedial holding concerning the scope of the substan-
tive equal protection guarantee—rather than, say, a remedy-
specific holding about the availability of injunctive remedies for 
equal protection violations—it unleashed the forces of spillover 
across remedies. No court thereafter deemed itself free to con-
sider the possibility of varying disparate impact requirements 
across civil-criminal lines, even though different remedial dy-
namics might well have warranted a different substantive ap-
proach. Consequently, the same substantive equal protection 
law now applies in two very different remedial contexts, even 
 71. In addition, as Professor Sklansky has pointed out, while the Court 
“has frequently expressed reluctance to insert itself into matters outside its 
traditional domain . . . [and] issues beyond the special competence of the judi-
ciary[,] . . . criminal sentencing is well inside that domain and close to the core 
of that competence.” Sklansky, supra note 65, at 1316. 
 72. None of this is to say that the Davis standard applies without differ-
entiation across the entire spectrum of equal protection cases. In fact, as Pro-
fessor Daniel Ortiz has observed, discriminatory intent requirements do in 
fact vary across several different areas of equal protection doctrine. See Daniel 
R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1107 
(1989) (suggesting that the intent requirement “allocates . . . burdens [of proof 
between the individual and the state] differently in different contexts”); see 
also id. at 1119–35 (noting that in “jury selection, voting, and education cas-
es,” the Court allows “individuals to establish . . . inferences [of discriminatory 
motivation] . . . with something close to a showing of mere disparate impact”); 
Bertrall L. Ross II, The Representative Equality Principle: Disaggregating the 
Equal Protection Intent Standard, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 175, 191–97 (2012). 
Thus, it would be incorrect to say that the Court has always shown insensitivi-
ty to context in crafting and applying the Davis rule. Even so, as the crack-
cocaine cases illustrate, some areas of equal protection doctrine still adhere 
strictly to the letter of Davis, and within these areas, the threat of cross-
remedial spillover remains. 
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though fundamental differences between these two contexts 
might well warrant disparate forms of disparate impact review. 
C. HYBRID STATUTES 
The examples offered to this point come from the domain of 
constitutional law. But spillover across remedies can occur in 
other fields as well. Congress sometimes enacts “hybrid stat-
utes,” which create nonconstitutional norms subject to both civ-
il and criminal enforcement.73
The distortions can run in both directions. Consider first 
what Professor Lawrence Solan calls “statutory inflation.”
 These hybrid statutes create dif-
ficulties when the civil or criminal nature of a case brings itself 
to bear on an unresolved question of statutory interpretation, 
thus creating precedent that governs within both remedial set-
tings. 
74 As 
he explains, “[d]eeply entrenched in our system of statutory ju-
risprudence are two complementary canons of construction: 
Remedial [i.e., civil] statutes are interpreted liberally; penal 
statutes are interpreted narrowly.”75 Consequently, for hybrid 
statutes, when interpretive questions first manifest themselves 
in the civil setting, courts might end up favoring “broad inter-
pretations” that then “spill over to criminal cases, causing an 
increase in criminal liability.”76 Put another way, interpreta-
tions that courts might have rejected in stand-alone criminal 
cases still find their way into the criminal setting, via cross-
remedial spillover of an earlier civil holding that broadens the 
applicability of a hybrid statute.77
 
 73. See, e.g., Margaret V. Sachs, Harmonizing Civil and Criminal En-
forcement of Federal Regulatory Statutes: The Case of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1025, 1030–33. 
 
 74. Solan, supra note 22, at 2213. 
 75. Id. at 2211–12. 
 76. Id. at 2213. Or, courts might apply Chevron deference to an agency’s 
broad interpretation of a hybrid statute in a civil action and then abide by that 
interpretation in a subsequent criminal case. See Solan, supra note 22, at 2214 
(“Although the application of the Chevron doctrine is consistent with the broad 
interpretation of remedial statutes, if Congress also decides to criminalize the 
willful violation of regulations, statutory inflation is likely to occur.”). 
 77. For those who view the rule of lenity as grounded entirely in fair-
notice values, statutory inflation may seem unproblematic. If a civil holding 
endorses a broad interpretation of a hybrid statute at Time A, then future 
criminal defendants should be able to anticipate that the Time A interpreta-
tion will govern their prosecution at Time B. Put another way, as long as the 
“inflating” civil holding precedes the “inflated” criminal holding, and as long as 
everyone understands that judicial interpretations of hybrid statutes apply 
uniformly across both civil and criminal cases, then everyone should get fair 
Coenen_MLR  
1234 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:1211 
 
Solan highlights several examples of statutory inflation.78 
Consider, for instance, insider-trading regulation under federal 
securities law. Neither § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
nor SEC Rule 10b-5 makes explicit reference to insider trad-
ing.79 Nevertheless, in Chiarella v. United States, the Supreme 
Court deemed this practice criminally punishable under these 
laws.80 In Chiarella, however, the Court was not writing on a 
blank slate. Instead, its ruling in the case derived from a dec-
ade’s worth of “administrative decisions and circuit court deci-
sions,” all of which had involved private and administrative re-
quests for civil relief.81 In citing to these cases, the Court in 
Chiarella never paused to ask whether the criminal nature of 
the case before it warranted a different interpretive approach.82 
Consequently, as Solan explains, “criminal application of Rule 
10b-5 in the context of insider trading grew out of the broad in-
terpretation of the rule in civil cases, in part as the result of 
aggressive administrative enforcement actions brought earlier 
by the SEC.”83
Hybrid statutes are just as susceptible to “deflationary” in-
terpretations as they are to “inflationary” ones. Consider Unit-
 
 
notice. Not everyone, however, believes fair-notice values to be the exclusive 
concern of the rule of lenity. The rule also might serve, for instance, the liber-
tarian purpose of limiting the reach of criminal statutes, cf. United States v. 
Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) (characterizing the rule as 
“founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals”), as well as 
the structural purposes of ensuring legislative primacy in the drafting of crim-
inal statutes, see Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 57, 141–43 (1998), “compel[ling] legislatures to detail the 
breadth of prohibitions in advance of their enforcement,” Zachary Price, The 
Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 887 (2004), and 
“compel[ling] prosecutors to charge crimes with enough specificity to indicate 
to voters—and juries—what conduct has been treated as criminal,” id. Under 
these and other accounts of the lenity rule, statutory inflation remains a prob-
lem worth worrying about. 
 78. Solan, supra note 22, at 2238–55. 
 79. Id. at 2238; see 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013). 
 80. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 81. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 
833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968) (“[T]he securities laws should be interpreted as an ex-
pansion of the common law both to effectuate the broad remedial design of 
Congress and to insure uniformity of enforcement.” (citations omitted)). 
 82. As Solan emphasizes, the Court in Chiarella “certainly did not consid-
er the rule of lenity.” Solan, supra note 22, at 2239. 
 83. Id. at 2239–40; see also Transcript, Roundtable on Insider Trading: 
Law, Policy, and Theory After O’Hagan, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 7, 15 (1998) 
(statement of Professor Roberta Karmel) (discussing this problem in similar 
terms). 
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ed States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co.84 In this case, an arms 
dealer sought a refund of a $200 tax levy, the validity of which 
turned on the meaning of the term “firearm” as used in the Na-
tional Firearms Act (NFA).85 A plurality of Justices resolved the 
statutory ambiguity by invoking the rule of lenity (which calls 
for resolving ambiguities in criminal statutes in the defendant’s 
favor), even though the case before them involved civil rather 
than criminal remedies.86 Justice Souter’s plurality opinion jus-
tified this move by pointing to the hybrid nature of the NFA.87 
As he explained, “although it is a tax statute that we construe 
now in a civil setting, the NFA has criminal applications that 
carry no additional requirement of willfulness.”88 Framed as a 
rule of substantive law, Thompson/Center Arms’ interpretive 
holding would inevitably control in both civil and criminal cas-
es. And for that reason, the plurality opted for a narrow inter-
pretation of the statutory language, thus accommodating (albe-
it preemptively) the rule-of-lenity concerns that criminal cases 
might one day raise.89
The Court in Thompson/Center Arms thus managed to 
head off the sort of statutory inflation that Chiarella reflects. 
But rather than prevent spillover from happening, the decision 
simply diverted the spillover in a different direction. Since 
Thompson/Center Arms was a civil case, the rule of lenity 
would not normally have come into play. It was only the pro-
spect of future criminal proceedings, based on the same statu-
tory language, that triggered the Court’s invocation of the leni-
ty rule. In that sense, the Thompson/Center Arms plurality 
chose to “deflate” rather than “inflate.” It artificially constricted 
the scope of the statute in a civil case so as to adopt what it 
viewed as the proper interpretation for criminal cases. 
 
D. TRIAL ERRORS AND APPELLATE REVERSAL 
Under the law of harmless error, appellate courts may ex-
cuse certain trial errors as nonprejudicial.90
 
 84. 504 U.S. 505 (1992). For illuminating discussions of Thompson/Center 
Arms, see Kristin E. Hickman, Of Lenity, Chevron, and KPMG, 26 VA. TAX. 
REV. 905, 920–21 (2007); Sachs, supra note 
 Some errors, how-
73, at 1036; and Solan, supra note 
22, at 2253–55. 
 85. Thompson/Ctr. Arms, 504 U.S. at 505 (plurality opinion). 
 86. Id. at 506. 
 87. Id. at 517. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 518. 
 90. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). 
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ever, are not subject to harmless error analysis. These errors, 
known as “structural errors,” trigger a rule of automatic rever-
sal; no instance of structural error may be excused as harmless, 
regardless of its real-world impact.91
Commentators have suggested that the automatic reversal 
remedy induces courts to define structural rights narrowly.
 
92 It 
is costly to reverse convictions and to redo trials below, so ap-
pellate courts will therefore hesitate to impose these costs on 
lower courts when the alleged errors seem minor.93 When judg-
es feel this way about non-structural errors, they are often able 
to uphold convictions on grounds of harmlessness, reasoning 
that even though errors occurred below, they were not prejudi-
cial enough to warrant full-scale appellate relief.94 With struc-
tural errors, however, the harmless error option is unavailable, 
so that the only way not to reverse is to hold that no error oc-
curred in the first place.95 It is this dynamic that may render 
appellate courts less inclined to recognize structural errors, for 
which reversal is mandatory, than non-structural errors, for 
which the harmless-error release valve is at least sometimes 
available.96 In this way, the automatic reversal rule may end up 
diluting, rather than strengthening, structural protections.97
But so what? Perhaps it is just an unchangeable fact of the 
world that appeals court judges are disinclined to reverse con-
victions on supposed “technicalities.” And, from the perspective 
of a criminal defendant, the question of whether appellate 
judges should avoid reversals by declaring that no error oc-
curred or by declaring that an error was harmless, seems be-
side the point. From a broader societal perspective, moreover, 
the difference may also seem to be of little consequence. True, 
making harmless error analysis available for structural claims 
would lessen the pressure on judges to define the substantive 
law narrowly.
 
98
 
 91. Shepard, supra note 
 But permitting judges to convert “structural” 
errors into nonstructural ones would also result in harmless-
9, at 1182–83. 
 92. Levinson, supra note 8, at 891 (“Automatic reversal is obviously a ra-
ther severe remedy for any criminal case.”); Shepard, supra note 9, at 1183 
(highlighting examples of cases in which courts have “weakened” structural 
rights “to avoid applying the drastic remedy of automatic reversal”). 
 93. Shepard, supra note 9, at 1186–87. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1188. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 1187. 
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error “losses” for defendants who might have prevailed under a 
pro-structural-error regime. The right would expand while the 
remedy contracted, with the sum availability of appellate relief 
likely remaining much the same. 
This analysis of the structural error rule, however, over-
looks its distinctively problematic spillover effects. The difficul-
ty is that the rights-limiting effect of the automatic reversal 
remedy feeds back into trial court resolution of structural 
claims. In contrast to appellate courts, which resolve claims of 
trial error after the fact, trial courts resolve most such claims 
as they arise. Consequently, the remedial costs of recognizing 
an error at trial are far less significant than the costs of doing 
so on appeal. If, for instance, a trial court finds that testimony 
violates a hearsay rule, it can simply strike the testimony from 
the record.99 If it finds that physical evidence was unlawfully 
obtained, it can prohibit introduction of the evidence.100 If it 
finds that a juror has behaved improperly, it can replace that 
juror with an alternate.101
Thus we encounter another instance of cross-remedial 
spillover. When the high remedial costs of automatic reversal 
prompt an appellate court to declare that no trial error oc-
curred, the appellate court creates precedents that trial courts 
must follow, even though trial courts operate in a setting where 
the same claims of error are far less costly to vindicate. Consid-
erations specific to the remedial request for appellate reversal, 
in other words, threaten to produce a weaker set of legal pro-
tections than what trial court judges might otherwise be willing 
to endorse. 
 In each of these instances, the sub-
stantive error gets remediated without significant disruption to 
the case itself. For the appellate judge, however, these same er-
rors point to one and only one remedial option: reversing the 
conviction outright and requiring retrial from scratch. 
Consider Batson v. Kentucky’s prohibition on race-based 
peremptory challenges.102 Batson errors are structural errors, 
mandating automatic reversal on appeal.103
 
 99. FED. R. EVID. 3(d). 
 This state of affairs 
has likely narrowed the scope of Batson protections, with appel-
 100. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961). 
 101. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c). 
 102. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 103. The Supreme Court has never expressly declared that Batson errors 
are structural, but lower courts have unanimously characterized them as such. 
See Jason Mazzone, Batson Remedies, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1613, 1618 n.28 (2012). 
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late courts, in Professor Pamela Karlan’s words, “surreptitious-
ly redefin[ing] the right” to avoid the costly remedy of automat-
ic reversal and full-scale retrials.104 But remediating Batson er-
rors at trial is cheap; the judge need only respond to a violation 
by prohibiting the exclusion of a challenged juror, or empanel-
ing a new jury before the trial begins.105 Left to their own devic-
es, then, trial courts might give Batson more bite than appel-
late courts have accorded it. Instead, these courts must take 
their guidance from their appellate-court counterparts, who ad-
judicate Batson claims in connection with high-cost remedial 
requests.106
Another example involves the Sixth Amendment right to 
public trial. Most appellate courts regard this right as struc-
tural,
 
107 meaning that they cannot avoid automatic reversals by 
invoking the harmless error rule. Perhaps for this reason, sev-
eral courts have grafted a “triviality standard” onto the right 
itself.108 Thus, as the D.C. Circuit has explained, even unjusti-
fied exclusions of the public from trial-level proceedings may 
not violate the Constitution, so long as these closures do not in-
fringe the “values served by the Sixth Amendment.”109 Although 
the court has insisted that applying this triviality standard 
does not equate to conducting harmless error analysis,110
 
 104. Karlan, supra note 
 the 
two tests operate in similar ways. Both seek to screen out Sixth 
12, at 2021. 
 105. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Batson Ethics for Prosecutors and Trial 
Court Judges, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 475, 500 (1998) (“There will always be a 
reluctance to reverse a conviction because the costs of retrying any case are 
high. Trial court actors, not faced with those costs, can actually afford to be 
more singleminded in their devotion to the Constitution—if they want to be.”). 
For a survey and discussion of the various ways in which trial judges have re-
mediated Batson violations, see Mazzone, supra note 103, at 1629–30. 
 106. There is, to be sure, some play in the joints here. Citing Professor 
Karlan’s work, Daryl Levinson has suggested that, in fact, “the Batson right as 
applied by trial judges, with a mild remedy, is significantly more expansive 
than the Batson right as applied by appellate judges, with a severe remedy.” 
Levinson, supra note 8, at 892. If correct, such data would reveal that Batson 
law has been secretly disaggregated across the trial-court and appeals-court 
remedial contexts, with the former adhering to a more robust version of the 
doctrine than the latter. Even so, the data would not disprove the existence of 
cross-remedial spillover; perhaps trial judges are still enforcing the Batson 
right less generously than they would be in the absence of the appellate court 
guidance they currently receive.  
 107. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 44–46 (1984). 
 108. See, e.g., United States v. Perry, 479 F.3d 885, 890–91 (D.C. Cir. 
2007); Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 109. See Peterson, 85 F.3d at 43. 
 110. See id. at 42. 
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Amendment harms of insufficient severity to warrant reversal 
of a conviction on appeal. Nevertheless, a non-trivial difference 
marks the two rules. Unlike the harmless error doctrine, which 
governs only the availability of the reversal remedy, the “trivi-
ality standard” governs the availability of all potential remedies 
linked to the public-trial right. Thus, for example, if a trial 
judge realizes that members of the public were improperly ex-
cluded from a portion of voir dire proceedings, the triviality 
standard might justify her decision not to redo jury selection. 
In making that decision, however, the judge would be applying 
a standard that appellate courts had developed in the interest 
of preserving convictions after the fact.111
E. PROBABLE CAUSE AND THE EXCLUSIONARY REMEDY 
  
Yet another instance of the spillover problem might be lo-
cated in the complex interrelationship between substantive 
Fourth Amendment law and the remedy of suppressing unlaw-
fully acquired evidence. Suppression motions can make or 
break a criminal prosecution, with success for the defendant of-
ten meaning that an obviously culpable criminal goes free.112 
While some commentators have criticized this aspect of the ex-
clusionary rule as resulting in the over-protection of Fourth 
Amendment rights,113 others have attacked it for doing precise-
ly the opposite. “Judges,” as Professor Akhil Amar has ex-
plained, “do not like excluding bloody knives.”114 Consequently, 
when asked to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment 
grounds, judges find ways to “distort doctrine, claiming the 
Fourth Amendment was not really violated.”115
 
 111. This claim depends on the assumption that trial court judges care 
more about getting the law right than they do about shielding their judgments 
from appellate reversal. Otherwise, a triviality exception to the public trial 
rule would render our hypothetical judge no more inclined to remediate a mi-
nor infringement of the right than would a rule providing for harmless error 
analysis on appeal. To a purely results-oriented judge, both a triviality excep-
tion to the right and a harmless error exception to the remedy reduce the like-
lihood of reversal on appeal, and neither rule would therefore motivate the 
judge to remediate a public trial violation immediately after it occurred. But 
for judges who seek compliance with the substantive law for its own sake, the 
impact of an exception to the public trial right would be more pronounced than 
an exception to the reversal remedy on appeal. 
 Other scholars 
 112. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.). 
 113. See, e.g., id. at 589 (suggesting that, under an exclusionary regime, 
“protection for the individual would . . . be gained at a disproportionate loss of 
protection for society”). 
 114. Amar, supra note 9, at 799. 
 115. Id.  
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have echoed this concern,116 and some judges themselves have 
recognized this play of cause and effect.117 Drawing on his own 
experience on the federal bench, for example, Judge Guido 
Calabresi has stated that “the exclusionary rule has been the 
reason for more diminutions in privacy protection than any-
thing else going on today.”118
In addition to judges’ visceral (and some would say under-
standable) reluctance to grant remedial windfalls, the suppres-
sion remedy presents a further deterrent to the recognition of 
Fourth Amendment violations: hindsight bias. If judges are like 
the rest of us, then they will have a hard time preventing their 
ex post knowledge about the outcome of a search from affecting 
what is supposed to be an ex ante inquiry into its lawfulness.
 
119
 
 116. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma of the Exclusionary 
Rule: An Application of Restitutive Principles of Justice, 32 EMORY L.J. 937, 
959–66 (1983); Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary 
Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 656–60 (2011); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & 
George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1387, 
1407 (2007); Leong, supra note 
 
And that poses an especially acute problem in criminal cases, 
where the only searches that come up for Fourth Amendment 
13, at 431; Jack Wade Nowlin, The Warren 
Court’s House Built on Sand: From Security in Persons, Houses, Papers, and 
Effects to Mere Reasonableness in Fourth Amendment Doctrine, 81 MISS. L.J. 
1017, 1077 (2012). 
 117. Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An 
Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 76 
(1992) (drawing on survey responses from judges and lawyers to suggest “that 
judges in Chicago often knowingly credit police perjury and distort the mean-
ing of the law to prevent the suppression of evidence and assure conviction”). 
 118. Calabresi, supra note 9, at 112. 
 119. See Jonathan D. Casper, Kennette Benedict & Jo L. Perry, The Tort 
Remedy in Search and Seizure Cases: A Case Study in Juror Decision Making, 
13 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 279, 298–300 (1988) (finding evidence of hindsight bi-
as in test jurors’ assessment of hypothetical searches); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey 
J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. 
REV. 777, 802–05 (2001) (finding experimental evidence of hindsight bias in 
judges’ assessment of a hypothetical Rule 11 sanctions issue); Andrew E. 
Taslitz, Foreword: The Death of Probable Cause, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Summer 2010, at viii (“Ample psychological theory and empirical data, albeit 
mostly in other contexts, supports the idea that hindsight bias is at work in 
the probable-cause determination.”). But see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guth-
rie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Probable Cause, Probability, and Hindsight (Vand. 
Pub. L. Res. Paper No. 11-25, 2011) (presenting experimental evidence indicat-
ing that judges may be resistant to hindsight bias in evaluating searches for 
probable cause), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1877125; Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie, & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can 
Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disre-
garding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1313–18 (2005) (same). 
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review have already yielded incriminating evidence.120 Try as 
judges might to ignore the fact of a search’s success, they may 
still sometimes succumb to hindsight bias in asking whether 
agents had probable cause to conduct the search in the first 
place. In Professor William Stuntz’s words, “[i]t must be much 
harder for a judge to decide that an officer had something less 
than probable cause to believe cocaine was in the trunk of a de-
fendant’s car when the cocaine was in fact there.”121
An oft-cited cost of these phenomena is the under-
deterrence of police misconduct.
 And if that 
is so, the suppression remedy will produce a narrowed set of 
Fourth Amendment protections, especially where probable 
cause determinations are involved. 
122
Consider, for instance, the interplay between after-the-fact 
suppression hearings and before-the-fact evaluations of war-
rant applications. Warrant proceedings do not present all of the 
rights-constricting tendencies that affect after-the-fact deci-
sions about the exclusionary remedy. Ex ante review of a 
search warrant application raises only the attenuated possibil-
ity that denying the warrant at that time will preclude the gov-
ernment from later prosecuting a criminal—the reviewer, after 
all, does not know whether the search will bear fruit or wheth-
er some later investigatory effort will turn up the evidence in 
 The longer the exclusionary 
remedy remains the primary means of Fourth Amendment en-
forcement, the more littered with loopholes the right will be-
come, and law enforcement officers will become freer to impinge 
on individual privacy interests. But there is a further cost as 
well, which involves cross-remedial spillover in Fourth 
Amendment lawmaking. The exclusionary rule is not the only 
mechanism for enforcing Fourth Amendment rights; litigants 
may also raise Fourth Amendment claims in connection with 
requests for prospective or monetary relief. In addition, magis-
trate judges review warrant applications before deciding 
whether or not to authorize a search. Cross-remedial applica-
tion of Fourth Amendment law might well expose these reme-
dial environments to the right-limiting influences of the exclu-
sionary rule. 
 
 120. See Slobogin, supra note 12, at 403. 
 121. Stuntz, supra note 12, at 912. 
 122. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Seven Theses In Grudging Defense of the Ex-
clusionary Rule, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 525, 545 (2013) (noting that “some 
commentators have complained that the Court’s willingness to recognized ex-
ceptions to exclusion has unduly compromised its deterrent efficacy”).  
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any event—whereas ex post review of a suppression motion 
presents the certainty that invalidating the search means 
withholding inculpatory evidence from a jury’s eyes. For this 
reason, as Professor Stuntz once surmised, it may well be that 
in unsettled areas of law, “magistrates apply a higher standard 
to warrant applications before the fact than do judges in sup-
pression hearings after the fact.”123
That, in any event, is the prima facie case for attributing 
cross-remedial spillover effects to the exclusionary rule. But the 
case requires some hedging, for two reasons. To begin, and as I 
will discuss further in Parts III and IV, the remedial and sub-
stantive rules in the Fourth Amendment context have already 
developed some safeguards against spillover. The Supreme 
Court, for instance, has carved out various exceptions to the ex-
clusionary remedy,
 But it also must be that 
once the law is settled, appellate and trial judges will apply the 
same settled law—settled law that comes from the hands of ap-
pellate courts that act with the exclusion of evidence in mind. 
In other words, magistrate judges’ probable cause determina-
tions must comport with Fourth Amendment precedents their 
superiors have created, and these precedents often involve re-
quests to suppress probative evidence. The remedy-specific in-
fluences of the exclusionary rule, combined with the cross-
remedial uniformity of Fourth Amendment law, would thus 
render magistrates’ review of warrants less rights-protective 
than they otherwise would and should be. 
124
Second, it may be incorrect to presume that magistrate 
judges who review warrant applications ex ante would develop 
a stricter set of probable cause requirements if left to their own 
devices. To be sure, the ex-ante warrant application process 
does not raise the specter of hindsight bias, and it also involves 
a “remedy” (namely, the denial of a warrant application) that 
imposes fewer expected costs on the government than the out-
right suppression of evidence. (In particular, denial of a search 
 which, framed in terms of the remedy ra-
ther than the right, allow courts to deny exclusionary relief 
without affecting Fourth Amendment protections in other re-
medial settings. Thus, while the exclusionary rule is theoreti-
cally capable of generating cross-remedial spillover effects, the 
law of evidentiary exclusion may have evolved to a point at 
which cross-remedial spillover no longer presents a serious 
problem. 
 
 123. Stuntz, supra note 12, at 936–37. 
 124. See supra Part III.A. 
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warrant does not let anyone go free; it simply forces law en-
forcement officers to develop a stronger evidentiary basis for 
their suspicions before conducting a search.) At the same time, 
the warrant-application setting may present its own set of 
rights-deterring forces. Most importantly, these proceedings 
are ex parte affairs, with repeat players on the government side 
arguing unopposed for the granting of a warrant application.125 
In addition, officers may sometimes file warrant applications in 
the course of urgent, high-pressure investigations, in which 
even a one-off denial might preclude the government from ob-
taining valuable evidence or preventing a dangerous suspect 
from doing further harm.126
With these two caveats in mind, however, it remains fair to 
say that the remedy-specific forces of the suppression-hearing 
context might sometimes render judges considering suppres-
sion motions less likely to vindicate Fourth Amendment rights 
ex post than judges considering warrant applications ex ante. 
And, in any event, even if the exclusionary remedy does not 
cause major spillover problems within the warrant-application 
context, it may still artificially constrict the availability of other 
Fourth Amendment remedies, such as monetary and prospec-
tive relief for the victims of unlawful searches and seizures. In 
sum, spillover problems caused by the exclusionary remedy at 
least present a risk worth attending to. As long as the exclu-
sionary remedy remains an important means of enforcing 
Fourth Amendment protections, and insofar as the Fourth 
Amendment right applies uniformly across remedial contexts, 
 In these circumstances, even mar-
ginally meritorious warrant applications would enjoy a high 
likelihood of success, perhaps even more so than government 
attempts to defeat suppression motions ex post. For all of their 
supposed hostility to Fourth Amendment rights, then, post-
search requests for the exclusionary remedy may be at least as 
conducive to the recognition of Fourth Amendment protections 
as a magistrate’s review of warrant applications. And, if that is 
so, then the exclusionary remedy would not be responsible for 
causing, via spillover, an artificial narrowing of magistrate-
level Fourth Amendment law. 
 
 125. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (providing for ex parte review of warrant ap-
plications). 
 126. The “exigent circumstances” exception to the warrant requirement, 
see, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 242 (1973), should reduce 
the number of applications filed under emergency circumstances, but law en-
forcement officers might sometimes wish to err on the side of caution. 
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the rights-weakening forces associated with the exclusionary 
remedy will threaten to blunt the impact of the Fourth 
Amendment in cases that have nothing to do with the suppres-
sion of evidence. 
F. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND DOCTRINAL 
BORROWING 
The preceding examples have illustrated cross-remedial 
spillover occurring within single, discrete areas of doctrine. Yet 
similar forms of spillover can also occur as a result of explicit 
acts of doctrinal “borrowing.”127 This practice, as Professors 
Nelson Tebbe and Robert Tsai have defined it, occurs when 
courts “import[] doctrines, rationales, tropes, or other legal el-
ements from one area of constitutional law into another for 
persuasive ends.”128
Consider, for instance, the relationship between the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and state-
based attorney malpractice law. In Polk County v. Dodson, the 
Supreme Court foreclosed the use of civil § 1983 actions to re-
mediate Sixth Amendment violations by state public defenders, 
thus effectively channeling all federal ineffective assistance ad-
judication to collateral attacks on final criminal convictions.
 The basic idea is straightforward: When 
separate doctrinal domains confront analogous problems, 
courts can reference their prior work from one domain to facili-
tate their present work in another. This process, in turn, can 
give rise to spillover across remedies.  
129 
Consequently, Sixth Amendment case law has evolved in close 
association with the habeas remedy itself, with considerations 
of finality and interstate comity exerting a powerful influence 
on courts’ disposition of ineffective assistance claims.’130
 
 127. Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. 
L. REV. 459, 460 (2010). 
 Simply 
 128. Id. at 461.  
 129. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 & n.18 (1981) (prohibit-
ing the use of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to remedy ineffective assistance claims against 
public defenders); see also Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 509 (2003) 
(holding that an ineffective assistance claim arising from federal convictions 
may be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 regardless of whether it could have 
been raised on direct appeal). 
 130. For instance, the Court in Strickland v. Washington defended its 
adoption of a “prejudice” requirement for ineffective assistance claims by ex-
plaining that the nonprejudicial errors would not undermine “reliance on the 
outcome of the proceeding.” 466 U.S. 668, 691–92 (1984). It also rejected an 
alternative standard as “inadequate because it provides no way of deciding 
what impairments are sufficiently serious to warrant setting aside the outcome 
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put, courts often conflate the substantive validity of an individ-
ual’s ineffective assistance claim with the remedial propriety of 
granting habeas relief. 
Standing alone, none of this is necessarily problematic. 
Dodson has effectively isolated ineffective assistance litigation 
to the habeas context, so Sixth Amendment adjudication pre-
sents no other remedial regime for the remedy-specific influ-
ences of the habeas remedy to distort. With no other remedies 
on the table, it makes no difference (from the spillover perspec-
tive) whether courts channel their reluctance to grant relief in-
to substantive Sixth Amendment doctrine, or into remedy-
specific rules of habeas doctrine Even if remedy-specific influ-
ences end up affecting the scope of the Sixth Amendment right, 
very few (if any) Sixth Amendment cases will arise in which 
these remedy-specific influences won’t already be present. 
Nevertheless, spillover has arisen as a result of state 
courts’ decisions to “borrow” from the constitutional ineffective 
assistance standard in shaping their own standards of attorney 
malpractice liability.131 This act of borrowing, some have ar-
gued, unfairly stacks the deck against malpractice plaintiffs.132 
Federal ineffective assistance claims usually arise in the course 
of collateral attacks on criminal convictions.133
 
of the proceeding.” Id. at 693 (emphasis added). These and other aspects of the 
Strickland decision have led some commentators to characterize it as conflat-
ing questions of right and remedy. See, e.g., Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. 
McMunigal, Conceding Guilt, 23 CRIM. JUST. 57, 58 (2008) (suggesting that in 
Strickland “the contours of a violation of rights and the question of remedy 
bec[a]me confused”); Michael M. O’Hear, Bypassing Habeas: The Right to Ef-
fective Assistance Requires Earlier Supreme Court Intervention in Cases of At-
torney Incompetence, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 110, 111 (2012) (characterizing 
Strickland “as part of the line of habeas cases that were intended to minimize 
meddling by federal courts with state court judgments (especially death sen-
tences)”). 
 And in these 
 131. For example, some states apply claim preclusion rules that prohibit 
the bringing of malpractice claims against attorneys whose conduct has al-
ready withstood a Strickland challenge in a criminal case. See Meredith J. 
Duncan, Criminal Malpractice: A Lawyer’s Holiday, 37 GA. L. REV. 1251, 
1270–71 (2003); Susan M. Treyz, Note, Criminal Malpractice: Privilege of the 
Innocent Plaintiff?, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 719, 720, 725–26 (1991). 
 132. See Treyz, supra note 131, at 721, 723; see also Duncan, supra note 
131, at 1272 (“Although there is obviously value in the preservation of judicial 
resources, courts are wrong in concluding that ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims and criminal malpractice claims require equivalent findings in every 
instance.”). 
 133. Cf. Eve Brensike Primus, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 691 (2007) (noting 
that “defendants typically wait until their appeals are over, and then attack 
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contexts, as one commentator has pointed out, “[t]he institu-
tional and societal interest in the finality of convictions may 
create a reluctance to reverse a conviction even where the 
awarding of damages would be appropriate.”134 In this way, the 
“borrowing” of constitutional effective assistance doctrine with-
in state malpractice law creates undesirable spillover, render-
ing malpractice law more disadvantageous to plaintiffs than it 
otherwise would be.135
Remedial law and substantive law, as we have seen, are 
interdependent; the former dictates not just the real-world effi-
cacy of the latter, but also, to a large extent, its shape and 
scope. That reality, in my view, is inevitable—and not neces-
sarily unfortunate. As a conceptual matter, it is hard to think 
about rights apart from the remedial consequences of their ex-
istence.
 Even though nominally separate sub-
stantive domains, constitutional ineffective assistance stand-
ards and common law malpractice standards have begun to 
merge into a single substantive standard with cross-remedial 
scope.  
136
 
their convictions collaterally by alleging that their trial attorneys were consti-
tutionally ineffective”). 
 Further, the interplay between remedy-related vari-
 134. Treyz, supra note 131, at 727.  
 135. Nor does “spillover” occur exclusively across remedial boundaries; in-
deed, the phenomenon will arise any time contextual factors affect the defini-
tion of doctrinal rules that govern when these contextual factors are absent. 
“Spillover across space” might occur, for instance, when constitutional rights 
are defined in cases involving state government, but then govern in subse-
quent cases involving the federal government. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 
399 U.S. 78, 129 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (worrying that the Court had 
“dilute[d] a federal guarantee in order to reconcile the logic of ‘incorporation,’ 
the ‘jot-for-jot and case-for-case’ application of the federal right to the States, 
with the reality of federalism”); see also Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly 
Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 
1516 (2005). Or “spillover across time” might occur when stare decisis causes a 
holding from Time A to maintain operative effect at a later Time B, at which 
point the holding might no longer make sense. See, e.g., Burnet v. Coronado 
Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (advocating 
for a relaxation of stare decisis principles in the face of changed circumstances, 
so as to ensure that “this Court . . . bring[s] its opinions into agreement with 
experience and with facts newly ascertained”). Some of what this Article has 
to say about the spillover problem as applied to cross-remedial rules might 
thus carry implications for cognate forms of spillover within other areas of the 
law.  
 136. See Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 678–79 
(1983) (“The prospect of actualizing rights through a remedy . . . makes it inev-
itable that thoughts of remedy will affect thoughts of right, that judges’ minds 
will shuttle back and forth between right and remedy.”). 
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ables and rights-related decisions often makes sense.137 Some 
scholars, for instance, applaud the rule of lenity, citing the 
uniquely liberty-infringing dynamics of the criminal setting as 
a legitimate reason to construe criminal statutes narrowly.138 
More controversially, one might applaud, or at least refrain 
from condemning, judges’ contraction of substantive constitu-
tional protections in response to the exclusionary remedy. If in-
deed it is undesirable to let the “criminal . . . go free because 
the constable has blundered,”139
These points suggest that the project of trying to stop rem-
edies from affecting substantive law is a nonstarter. It does not 
follow, however, that we should ignore the phenomenon alto-
gether. To the contrary, precisely because remedies influence 
rights, courts must consider the types of substantive outcomes 
that particular remedial regimes favor. And that is especially 
so when substantive norms are defined in multiple remedial 
regimes, such that the remedy-specific influences of one regime 
stand ready to spill over into another. 
 some level of substantive nar-
rowing may be an appropriate response to an especially potent 
means of redress. 
II.  NON-DISAGGREGATION RESPONSES   
Cross-remedial spillover occurs when two things happen: 
first, a remedial environment influences the definition of a sub-
stantive rule; and second, the same substantive rule carries 
force in a different remedial environment.140
This Section identifies and evaluates strategies of the first 
variety, which aim to reduce spillover across remedies without 
in any way affecting the cross-remedial uniformity of substan-
 Efforts to mitigate 
spillover must therefore target at least one of these two events. 
That is, courts can combat spillover either by calibrating the 
ways in which remedial dynamics affect the definition and im-
plementation of a given substantive rule, or by varying the ap-
plication of substantive rules across different remedial con-
texts. 
 
 137. Cf. Fallon, Linkage, supra note 10, at 692 (“There should be no norma-
tive objection to courts openly seeking to achieve the optimal balance of mer-
its, justiciability, and remedial doctrines as long as they deal responsibly with 
such legally pertinent considerations as the constitutional text and judicial 
precedent.”).  
 138. See, e.g., Price, supra note 77, at 910–25; Solan, supra note 77, at 59–
60. 
 139. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926). 
 140. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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tive legal norms. I focus in particular on three such strategies, 
which I call (1) “all contexts” rights adjudication; (2) “remedial 
equalizing”; and (3) “remedial diversifying.” All three strate-
gies, we will see, are capable of reducing spillover across reme-
dies, by mitigating the extent to which a single remedy distorts 
the cross-remedial application of substantive norms. We will 
also see, however, that all three strategies suffer from signifi-
cant weaknesses, owing largely to their inability to accommo-
date variation across remedial lines. 
A. “ALL CONTEXTS” RIGHTS ADJUDICATION 
One anti-spillover strategy begins with a call for increased 
judicial awareness of the potential for the spillover problem to 
happen. The number one evil, on this view, is the judge who ad-
judicates substantive claims while wearing remedial blinders—
focusing only on the particular remedial request before her 
without considering how the substantive law she creates will 
operate in other remedial settings. We thus improve the spillo-
ver situation by directing judges’ attention to it; the hope is 
that a greater mindfulness of spillover across remedies will 
lead to reductions in its occurrence. 
This idea has gained traction in the literature on hybrid 
statutes. After recognizing the “core principle” that the mean-
ing of hybrid statutes must remain fixed across varying reme-
dial contexts,141 Professor Margaret Sachs has encouraged 
courts to abide by what she calls the “all contexts” rule: “In de-
ciding upon the single interpretation [of a hybrid statute] 
courts should not focus solely on the immediate enforcement 
context. Rather, they should apply the ‘all contexts’ rule, which 
requires them to consider every action to enforce the prohibi-
tion under the hybrid statute and the policies pertinent to 
each.”142
This strategy is reflected in Justice Souter’s plurality opin-
ion in Thompson/Center Arms. Recognizing the National Fire-
arms Act’s potential applicability in criminal proceedings, Jus-
tice Souter invoked the rule of lenity to resolve an interpretive 
ambiguity, even though the immediate case before him pre-
 
 
 141. See Sachs, supra note 73, at 1033; see also FCC v. Am. Broad. Co., 347 
U.S. 284, 296 (1994) (noting, with respect to civil and criminal enforcement of 
a hybrid statute, that “[t]here cannot be one construction for the [FCC] and 
another for the Department of Justice”). 
 142. Sachs, supra note 73, at 1033–34. 
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sented a request for civil relief.143
Although Professor Sachs’s argument applies to hybrid 
statutes, we could extend the “all contexts” principle to other 
doctrinal areas in which spillover occurs. For instance, we 
might criticize the Court in Washington v. Davis for failing to 
consider how a discriminatory purpose requirement would play 
out in the criminal setting, just as we might criticize the Court 
in Paul v. Davis for failing to consider how its “stigma-plus” 
rule would play out beyond the confines of constitutional tort 
cases. In these and other cases, the critical error takes the form 
of a judicial failure to appreciate the cross-remedial nature of 
the rules being crafted. When judges define rules that traverse 
remedial boundaries, they ought at least not pretend to be do-
ing otherwise. 
 The Thompson/Center Arms 
plurality, in other words, interpreted the statute with all reme-
dial contexts in mind. It did not let the remedial particulars of 
the case interfere with its resolution of a cross-remedial sub-
stantive question. 
But the “all contexts” approach hardly offers a panacea for 
spillover-related difficulties. For one thing, the rule seems ill 
equipped to handle the variety of subtle ways in which reme-
dies influence the shaping of substantive law. Many of the ex-
amples we encountered in Part I reveal remedial particularities 
that exert a quiet, unconsidered effect on courts’ adjudication of 
rights-related claims. When that is the case, a renewed com-
mitment to “all contexts” rights adjudication does not seem 
likely to ameliorate the initial distortions that remedies are 
creating. Telling courts when and when not to apply the rule of 
lenity is one thing; but telling them when and when not to suf-
fer from hindsight bias144—or when not to blanch at the pro-
spect of reversing a conviction for structural error145—is alto-
gether different.146
 
 143. United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 517–18 
(1992). 
 These tendencies are hardwired into human 
 144. See, e.g., supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 145. See, e.g., supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 146. For example, I earlier suggested that the exclusionary remedy artifi-
cially reduces the degree to which magistrate judges enforce Fourth Amend-
ment rights at probable cause hearings. See supra Part I.E. The mechanism is 
straightforward: (1) circumstances unique to suppression hearings deter the 
finding of Fourth Amendment violations by trial and appellate judges; and (2) 
magistrate judges, operating in the absence of the rights-contracting features 
of suppression hearings, must nonetheless take their cues from the very same 
doctrines their superiors have crafted. This is an area where “all contexts” 
rights adjudication seems unlikely to solve the spillover problem. The deter-
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psychology. Trying to consider “all remedial contexts” in the 
face of these impulses seems no less futile than trying not to 
feel them in the first place. 
A second and more severe shortcoming with the “all con-
texts” strategy lies in its inability to mediate between the com-
peting needs presented by different remedial environments. We 
saw in connection with Thompson/Center Arms that the plural-
ity’s resolution of hybrid-statute issue was in one sense unsatis-
factory; it did account for all remedial contexts, but only in a 
way that favored the remedial influences of the criminal con-
text over the civil context.147 That fact should not surprise us, 
because the plurality was trying to adopt a one-size-fits-all so-
lution for two very different remedial requests. As long as 
rights-based law must apply uniformly across remedial con-
texts, this same basic problem will arise. Suppose, for instance, 
that having considered all remedial contexts, the Court in 
Washington v. Davis concluded that a discriminatory purpose 
requirement was inapt for criminal proceedings but apt for civil 
proceedings. What then? Either the Court would have to stick 
to its guns and adopt a discriminatory purpose requirement, 
notwithstanding the requirement’s clumsy fit with criminal 
equal protection claims, or it would have to discard the discrim-
inatory purpose requirement and initiate the parade of 
horribles in civil cases over which the majority lost so much 
sleep. Openly embracing the “all contexts” approach would at 
least have allowed the Court to choose between the lesser of 
these two evils. But doing so would not have made the evils go 
away.148
In other words, the “all contexts” strategy solves the spillo-
ver problem only if we assume that one and only one substan-
tive rule can achieve optimal results across a variety of differ-
ent remedial settings. But that is a dubious premise and, once 
it is jettisoned, we should not expect “all contexts” rights-
making to deliver much in the way of anti-spillover success. To 
 
 
rent forces of the exclusionary remedy are powerful and difficult to resist, see 
supra notes 112–21 and accompanying text, so merely exhorting trial and ap-
pellate judges to ignore hindsight bias and to lighten up on criminal defend-
ants will not much improve the situation. 
 147. See Thompson/Ctr. Arms, 504 U.S. at 517–18. 
 148. Professor Sachs herself has noted that the “all contexts” strategy will 
often require compromise of one form or another. See Sachs, supra note 73, at 
1033–34 (noting that the “policies pertinent to” different remedial regimes can 
sometimes “conflict,” and that when that is the case, “courts should seek the 
most appropriate compromise”). 
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be sure, the strategy might sometimes mollify spillover across 
remedies by preventing considerations specific to one remedial 
environment from unduly dominating a judge’s construction of 
a cross-remedial rule. But sometimes, even the most thorough 
consideration of “all remedial contexts” may fail to yield a rule 
that properly accommodates the divergent needs of the contexts 
being considered. And when that is the case, judges hoping to 
alleviate spillover across remedies must turn to other tech-
niques. 
B. REMEDY EQUALIZING 
A second response to the spillover problem might involve 
the manipulation of remedies themselves. When one remedial 
rule produces significant substantive distortions in other reme-
dial settings, courts could mitigate spillover effects by tinkering 
with the structure of the remedy on which that rule is based. If 
the particularities of one remedial environment are interfering 
with a right’s application in another, then courts could make 
changes to one (or more) of the environments themselves, so as 
to equalize their effects on the definition of substantive norms. 
Assume, for instance, that within Fourth Amendment law, 
the exclusionary remedy causes unwanted spillover into other 
domains where the pressures against vindicating substantive 
claims are less intense. In response to this problem, we could 
simply replace the exclusionary remedy with something more 
modest. We could, for instance, introduce a regime that chan-
nels all Fourth Amendment claims into damages actions under 
Bivens and § 1983;149 we could replace the exclusionary remedy 
with an administrative damages remedy;150 we could replace it 
with a sentencing reduction remedy;151 we could replace it with 
enforcement by an internal ombudsman;152 and so forth.153
 
 149. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 
 In 
9, at 812–15. 
 150. See, e.g., L. Timothy Perrin et al., If It’s Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond 
the Exclusionary Rule—A New and Extensive Empirical Study of the Exclu-
sionary Rule and a Call for a Civil Administrative Remedy to Partially Replace 
the Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 743–55 (1998); Slobogin, supra note 12, at 405–
20. 
 151. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 9, at 116–18. 
 152. See, e.g., Robert P. Davidow, Criminal Procedure Ombudsman as a 
Substitute for the Exclusionary Rule: A Proposal, 4 TEX. TECH L. REV. 317 
(1973); Robert P. Davidow, Criminal Procedure Ombudsman Revisited, 73 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 939 (1982). 
 153. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 116, at 969–80 (restitutionary damages 
remedy); Ronald J. Rychlak, Replacing the Exclusionary Rule: Fourth 
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comparison to the exclusionary remedy, these and other alter-
native remedies might less severely deter the judicial recogni-
tion of Fourth Amendment violations.  
Consequently, such replacement remedies would do less 
cross-remedial damage to Fourth Amendment law, evening 
out—to some extent—the effects on substantive Fourth 
Amendment law that each applicable Fourth Amendment rem-
edy exerts. This could all be done, moreover, while maintaining 
absolute uniformity within the substantive law itself. The same 
Fourth Amendment law would apply regardless of whether a 
claimant sought damages, injunctions, sentencing reductions, 
or some other remedy for an unlawful search. But spillover 
would still abate as a result of our remedial reforms. No longer 
would one Fourth Amendment remedy exert disproportionate 
constricting effects on the law’s application within other reme-
dial contexts; instead, Fourth Amendment adjudication would 
occur against the backdrop of remedial regimes with more or 
less equivalent effects on substantive outcomes. 
Here is another example of how the equalizing strategy 
might work: I earlier suggested that appellate judges will be 
less likely to identify “structural” trial errors on appeal in com-
parison to trial-level judges evaluating structural claims as 
they arise.154
Even more extreme versions of this strategy might strive to 
isolate the adjudication of substantive norms within one and 
only one remedial setting. Congress, for instance, could stop 
passing hybrid statutes, choosing between civil or criminal 
 The culprit here is the reversal remedy, which 
renders after-the-fact remediation of a structural error far more 
costly than contemporaneous remediation of the same error at 
the trial level. That being so, Congress could provide for guar-
anteed interlocutory review of all trial-court rulings on struc-
tural claims. Appellate court judges would then confront allega-
tions of structural error in a remedial environment similar to 
the one that prevails in the trial court setting. Recognizing 
structural error on appeal would no longer mean vacating the 
outcome of a completed trial; rather, it would mean reversing 
only a particular order issued before a trial has concluded. 
Again, the reform might help to “equalize” remedial influences 
on the rights and thereby lessen the extent of spillover from 
one remedial setting to another. 
 
Amendment Violations as Direct Criminal Contempt, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
241, 249–53 (2010). 
 154. See supra Part I.D. 
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penalties as the sole enforcement mechanism for each new sub-
stantive norm it enshrines. Courts could wipe out civil rights 
tort law, by abolishing the Bivens action or overruling Monroe 
v. Pape,155
But by now it should be obvious that a “remedy equalizing” 
strategy would mitigate spillover in a highly problematic fash-
ion. Many objectives can, do, and should factor into the design 
of remedial rules, and only one of these objectives is the reduc-
tion of spillover across remedies. Remedies, after all, do not ex-
ist merely for the sake of influencing courts’ outlook on sub-
stantive issues; they serve the primary purpose of 
operationalizing and enforcing the substantive law on the 
ground. Thus, even when concerns about spillover might tempt 
us to scrap one remedial regime in favor of another, other con-
siderations will often counsel strongly against such reform. 
Mandatory interlocutory appeals for claims of structural error, 
for instance, might well reduce the extent of spillover that the 
post-trial reversal remedy brings about. But it would also 
lengthen the life spans of criminal prosecutions, complicating 
the prompt presentation of witness testimony and generating 
extra judicial work. In similar fashion, some alternatives to the 
exclusionary remedy—even if less likely to generate spillover 
effects—might be less effective at deterring law enforcement of-
ficers from violating core Fourth Amendment guarantees. Are 
the benefits to be gained from spillover reduction worth the 
costs to be incurred from weakened Fourth Amendment en-
forcement? That’s the sort of question we should ask when con-
sidering whether to pursue large-scale abandonment of now-
extant remedial structures. Other considerations should also 
enter into the calculus: What remedial arrangement is fairest 
to the constitutional claimant? What remedial arrangement 
best deters government misconduct? What remedial arrange-
ment is most easily administered by judges? And so on. None of 
this is to say that we should never reform remedies. Some of 
the remedial reforms already outlined might be well-founded 
 thus in effect relegating the enforcement of constitu-
tional rights solely to “defensive” remedies invoked during gov-
ernment-initiated proceedings. Congress could jettison the 
right to an appeal from criminal convictions, reasoning that 
trial-level rights adjudication would thereby become less vul-
nerable to interference from the remedy-specific influences of 
appellate review. And so forth. 
 
 155. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Monroe v. 
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
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for reasons having nothing to do with the spillover problem. 
But the project of restructuring remedies implicates far more 
than the single issue of cross-remedial spillover. It is not worth 
launching missiles to kill mice.156
C. REMEDY DIVERSIFYING 
 And it may not be worth pur-
suing large-scale remedial reforms simply for the sake of curb-
ing spillover across remedies. 
A final “non-disaggregation” strategy draws its inspiration 
from the fascinating recent scholarship of Professor Nancy 
Leong.157 Her core idea involves diversifying the remedial re-
gimes in which a given substantive right gets adjudicated, so as 
to improve the overall quality of rights-based law.158 The pro-
ject, to be clear, targets a somewhat different set of problems 
than does this Article.159
 
 156. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1035 (1992) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
 But its basic insights might provide 
 157. See Leong, supra note 13. 
 158. Id. at 466. 
 159. As I understand Professor Leong’s argument, the central worry is that 
the day-in, day-out implementation of a substantive norm in the same remedi-
al setting will weaken judges’ understanding of the norm itself. If judges do 
not adjudicate a substantive rule in multiple remedial contexts, Leong posits, 
they are likely to neglect important interests associated with the rule. See, 
e.g., id. at 462 (“Rights that emerge through litigation in more than one con-
text reflect a richer and more nuanced conception of doctrine.”); id. at 465 (not-
ing that “single-context rights-making leaves worse off . . . our understanding 
of Fourth Amendment rights”). Hence arises the need to diversify the remedial 
settings associated with a given right, so as to ensure that judges remain 
aware of the full panoply of interests that the right serves to promote. This 
objective would not necessarily require courts to apply substantive law uni-
formly across different remedial contexts—in theory, at least, courts could tai-
lor substantive rules according to remedial particularities, while still acquir-
ing an improved understanding of the norm itself. But Professor Leong has at 
least implicitly suggested that she envisions “multiple context” adjudication 
working in concert with a single, non-disaggregated body of rights-based law. 
See, e.g., Nancy Leong, Civilizing Batson, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1561, 1583 (2012) 
(“Litigation in multiple contexts generates better law. Courts see a wider 
range of interests and circumstances represented, and are more likely to craft 
doctrinal rules that will apply appropriately in all circumstances.” (emphasis 
added)). 
My concern, by contrast, is with the unwanted spillover that occurs when 
precedent shaped within one remedial context binds judges who would other-
wise respond differently to cases arising in separate remedial context. The 
worry, in other words, is that a judge who would like to pursue one particular 
resolution of a case (and who is fully aware of all the interests implicated by a 
given substantive norm) must sometimes follow precedent that derived from 
considerations related to a totally different set of remedial variables. That 
worry does not necessarily conflict with Professor Leong’s worry about deterio-
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the basis for a third anti-spillover strategy, which would at-
tempt to utilize the process of cross-remedial spillover against 
itself. 
Professor Leong has argued that courts and lawmakers 
should deliberately structure procedural and remedial rules to 
ensure that rights adjudication occurs within “multiple con-
texts.” That is so, she argues, because “when litigation of a par-
ticular right takes place only in one context, as is the case for 
many if not most constitutional rights, the inherent features of 
that context begin to distort the right.”160 Single-context rights-
making, among other things, will “tend[] to focus courts on 
some variables at the expense of others,” and will thus generate 
law that “less thoroughly considers the various circumstances 
in which it will apply, and less compellingly reflects the rela-
tionship of particular doctrines to our legal regime as a 
whole.”161 These problems can be avoided, she asserts, if we “ad-
just incentives so that litigation flourishes freely in multiple 
contexts.”162
These observations might form the basis of a third anti-
spillover strategy, which would pursue the diversification of 
remedial inputs on substantive law. Whereas the “remedy-
equalizing” strategy seeks to even out each existing remedy’s 
effect on a substantive rule, this strategy would strive simply to 
increase the number of remedies (notwithstanding their diver-
gent influences) that attach to that rule, with the effect that 
over time the remedy-specific influences will cancel one another 
out. One might say, for instance, that the centrality of some 
remedial contexts tends to exert distortive influences on rights-
based law—for example, in the manner that the habeas remedy 
tends to the constrict the right to effective assistance of coun-
sel
 
163
 
rated judicial understandings of substantive norms. But my prescribed solu-
tion to the problem I’ve identified might well undermine her prescribed solu-
tion to the problem she has identified, at least insofar as the latter requires 
the uniform application of rights-based law across divergent remedial settings. 
In my view, that would be a trade worth making. 
—and that’s just always going to be true. But other reme-
dies, one might say, could exert influences in the other direc-
tion—for example, in the manner that damages remedies under 
§ 1983 might permit more frequent judicial declarations that 
 160. Leong, supra note 13, at 407. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 472. 
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the ineffective assistance right has been violated.164 If both 
remedies were to enter the picture, each could serve to moder-
ate the other’s influence on the ineffective assistance right, 
thus allowing judges to strike a better balance between the 
competing interests at stake. Thus, for instance, ineffective-
assistance claimants in habeas proceedings would have more of 
a fighting chance if they could cite to some ineffective-
assistance precedents made in § 1983 proceedings, while con-
tinued habeas adjudication of effective-assistance claims will 
prevent § 1983 actions from creating an effective assistance 
right that unduly burdens defense attorneys. In short, the di-
versification strategy would allow courts to use spillover to 
their advantage, ensuring that over time, a properly balanced—
though still uniform—set of substantive rules will emerge.165
This strategy too, however, presents significant problems. 
For one thing, it is not clear that all remedy-specific influences 
on substantive rules require moderation of the sort that the di-
versification strategy would provide. Perhaps, for instance, 
judges in habeas cases are denying ineffective assistance claims 
at an appropriate rate, given the special concerns about finality 
that arise when habeas petitioners seek collateral relief. If so, 
overruling Polk County v. Dodson would not provide a neces-
sary corrective to the status quo.
 
166 Or perhaps an expansion of 
§ 1983 relief would, without more, strike a more appropriate 
balance between the competing interests in this field of law. In 
other words, even if the Court did reintroduce the § 1983 reme-
dy for ineffective assistance violations, we might not wish for 
lower courts to be relying on habeas-based ineffective-
assistance precedents when adjudicating damages-based inef-
fective assistance claims. Professor Leong appears to take it for 
granted that we should discourage remedial arrangements that 
“focus courts on some variables at the expense of others.”167
 
 164. Id. at 472–73. 
 But 
why should that be? Within some remedial settings it may be 
sensible to downplay the significance of some variables and to 
play up the significance of others. (Consider, for instance, the 
heightened sensitivity to liberty interests—and concomitantly 
 165. The idea here is different from the “all contexts” strategy discussed in 
Section II.A supra. The “all contexts” strategy calls on judges to bear in mind 
all remedial contexts currently associated with a substantive rule, whereas 
the diversification strategy calls on judges (and lawmakers) to increase the 
number of remedial contexts associated with that rule. 
 166. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981). 
 167. Leong, supra note 13, at 407. 
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reduced receptivity to government interests—that the rule of 
lenity reflects in criminal statutory interpretation cases.) And 
when that is so, the conscious pursuit of diversified remedial 
inputs would serve to frustrate rather than facilitate sensible 
balances that status quo regimes have already struck. 
In addition, the diversification strategy might cause one 
remedy’s influence on a substantive rule to outrun another’s. 
Sometimes remedy-specific influences might helpfully comple-
ment one another, but that is not the only possible outcome of 
the cross-pollination process that the diversification strategy 
promotes. Suppose, for example, that we had concluded that 
criminal adjudication of Fourth Amendment claims is biased in 
favor of law enforcement interests, whereas civil adjudication of 
analogous claims is biased in favor of privacy interests.168 We 
might envision a salutary averaging process emerging from a 
greater integration of these two remedial contexts, with the 
pro-government excesses of the criminal context neutralizing 
the anti-government excesses of the civil context (and vice ver-
sa). But the process might also yield a less happy equilibrium, 
with the doctrinal influences of the one remedial regime over-
compensating for (or perhaps totally overwhelming) those of 
the other. Perhaps, for instance, the diversification strategy 
would repair Fourth Amendment analysis in criminal cases, 
but only at the expense of rendering it too hostile to govern-
ment interests in civil cases. Or perhaps it will repair Fourth 
Amendment analysis in civil cases, but only at the expense of 
rendering it too pro-government in criminal cases. It is hard to 
know. Common law adjudication is a path-dependent process, 
whose outputs are highly sensitive to small fluctuations in the 
sequencing and frequency of the different inputs it digests.169
 
 168. Compare id. at 463 (noting that that criminal adjudication of Fourth 
Amendment claims tends to foreground the “evidence-gathering interest of law 
enforcement” while giving too little attention to “other interests that may or 
may not justify the use of force during the same police-citizen interaction”), 
with id. at 452 (speculating that civil adjudication of Fourth Amendment 
claims tends to “skew[] lawmaking by focusing courts’ attention on innocent 
plaintiffs—who may be unrepresentative of all those on whom force is used—
and on law enforcement interests relating to civilian violence and officer safe-
ty—which may fail to capture many significant law enforcement interests”). 
 
So, while it’s entirely possible that multiple-context rights-
adjudication could alleviate spillover in helpful ways, the ex-
periment could also backfire. 
 169. See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and 
Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 622–
50 (2001).  
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Finally, even assuming that the diversification strategy 
would improve the quality of substantive doctrine, there re-
mains the question of whether the game is worth the candle. 
Increasing the number of remedial inputs on substantive law 
necessarily means increasing the number of remedies available 
to individual litigants, whether through the direct introduction 
of new causes of action, or through indirect reforms to immuni-
ty doctrines, rules regarding attorneys’ fees, jurisdictional and 
justiciability requirements, and so forth.170 And so, we must 
ask: are the benefits to be gained from a more holistic, all-
things-considered body of rights-based law worth the costs that 
will result from letting more and more claimants into the 
courthouse? We might worry, among other things, about an av-
alanche of frivolous cases, crowded judicial dockets, and un-
wanted chilling effects on government behavior.171 Even more 
troubling is the danger that the project will create a boomerang 
effect, as judges faced with a significant expansion of constitu-
tional remedies would respond with reactionary contractions in 
the scope of constitutional guarantees.172
 
 These bad results—or 
even the risk of them—may not be worth enduring merely to 
foster the development of a more cross-fertilized body of sub-
stantive law. 
*   *   * 
 
Each of the non-disaggregation strategies that I have out-
lined in this Part suffers from serious problems. These prob-
lems, moreover, stem largely from the non-disaggregating na-
ture of the strategies themselves. Courts can adjudicate 
substantive law with “all remedial contexts” in mind, but they 
still must negotiate unsatisfactory compromises across varying 
remedial environments. Courts can “equalize” remedial struc-
tures, so as to reduce the extent of spillover from one domain to 
another, but by equalizing these structures they will tamper 
with a whole host of other priorities that the structures them-
selves have been designed to promote. And courts can diversify 
the remedial settings in which they fashion substantive rules, 
 
 170. See Leong, supra note 13, at 477. 
 171. See generally Marin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litigation, 80 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1007 (2013) (separating out and evaluating the validity of argu-
ments along these lines). 
 172. Professor Leong herself notes this possibility. See Leong, supra note 
13, at 477. 
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but only by incurring the risk of exacerbating rather than ame-
liorating spillover across remedies. The strategies all carry lim-
ited promise, in other words, because they attempt to force dif-
ferent types of feet into one and the same shoe. 
That being so, we should look for productive ways in which 
to scale back the uniform, cross-remedial operation of the sub-
stantive law. Rather than target the manner in which particu-
lar remedies exert influences on the content of particular sub-
stantive rules, courts should focus their energies on preventing 
those influences from migrating into remedial environments 
where they would not otherwise have taken hold. That is, in my 
view, a more promising approach to the problem of spillover 
across remedies. It is also, as the next section shows, an ap-
proach that the law has already begun to pursue. 
III.  DISAGGREGATING SUBSTANTIVE LAW   
Though not often admitting to it, courts have sometimes 
departed from the idea that substantive rules should apply uni-
formly across different remedial contexts. They most often have 
achieved the departure through the development and use of 
built-in exceptions to remedial rules. Remedial exceptions, I ar-
gue, represent the primary means by which courts manage 
cross-remedial spillover. When, for instance, a court cites the 
qualified immunity rule as the basis for denying a claim for 
damages under § 1983, it leaves itself free to vindicate similar 
substantive claims raised in connection with different remedial 
requests. When a court cites the good-faith exception to the ex-
clusionary rule as the basis for its denial of a suppression mo-
tion, the decision leaves open the possibility that identical gov-
ernment conduct might still trigger other forms of relief. And 
when an appeals court cites the harmless error rule as the ba-
sis for not reversing a judgment below, it leaves trial judges 
free to remediate identical errors in future cases. Remedial ex-
ceptions thus enable judges to deny relief in a manner that 
leaves the operation of other remedies unaffected. Rather than 
reject a substantive claim on its merits, judges may instead 
reach for an exception to the remedy itself, and thereby create 
precedent that lacks cross-remedial effect. 
The upshot of all of this is disaggregated rights across 
remedies.173
 
 173. A small terminological point: even though the terms “disaggregation” 
and “diversification” may share some connotations, the “disaggregation” strat-
egy I discuss in this Part bears little similarity to the “diversification” strategy 
 With remedial exceptions in place, one substantive 
Coenen_MLR  
1260 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:1211 
 
claim can trigger some forms of judicial relief, but not others. 
And that means, in effect, that the scope of a substantive norm 
is varied across the different remedies used to enforce it. It is 
true, of course, that remedial exceptions do not inject any for-
mal variation into the substantive law itself (the good faith ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule, for instance, does not purport 
to alter Fourth Amendment doctrine proper; it simply says that 
a certain remedy cannot issue when certain Fourth Amend-
ment claims are raised).174 But as a functional matter, remedial 
exceptions often exert an unmistakably disaggregating effect on 
substantive legal rules—rendering the same rules more or less 
difficult to remediate depending solely on the type of remedia-
tion sought.175
A. THE DISAGGREGATING EFFECT OF REMEDIAL EXCEPTIONS 
 Thus, if we desire to manage spillover by way of 
exceptions to remedial rules, we must also be willing to tolerate 
cross-remedial variation in the substantive law.  
The disaggregating effect of remedial exceptions is perhaps 
best illustrated by reference to the exclusionary rule. Not long 
after Mapp v. Ohio176
 
I discussed in Part II.C supra. The former involves disaggregating the defini-
tion of substantive norms across different remedial domains, while the latter 
involves diversifying the different remedial inputs that go into the crafting of a 
single, non-disaggregated substantive law. 
 did the Court begin identifying types of 
Fourth Amendment violations that did not warrant suppres-
sion, and the number of these carve-outs has grown over the 
years. The suppression remedy is not available, for instance, 
when officers have relied in good faith on an unlawfully issued 
 174. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923–24 (1984) (noting 
that “[i]n so limiting the suppression remedy, we leave untouched the proba-
ble-cause standard and the various requirements for a valid warrant”). 
 175. In advancing the claim that remedial exceptions exert a disaggregat-
ing effect on the substantive law, I do not mean to imply that such exceptions 
change the essentialist meaning or content of substantive norms. This is a 
contested issue. See Levinson, supra note 8. But see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 1274, 1313–17 (2006). But it is irrelevant to my central point here, which 
is that remedial exceptions mitigate spillover across remedies by varying the 
applicability of substantive norms across different remedial settings. I believe 
it is helpful to characterize this phenomenon as involving the “disaggregation” 
of substantive law, but one might just as well characterize it as involving “se-
lective withholding” of different remedies from a uniformly defined substan-
tive rule. The disaggregation strategy, in other words, should appeal to prag-
matists and essentialists alike, though the latter may wish to call it by a 
different name. 
 176. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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warrant.177 The remedy is not available when the officers’ only 
Fourth Amendment violation involves a failure to honor the 
“knock and announce” requirement,178 or when officers have un-
lawfully acquired evidence that inevitably would have been dis-
covered in the absence of the Fourth Amendment violation.179 
In these and other circumstances, the operative remedial rules 
allow courts to recognize that Fourth Amendment violations 
have occurred while still refusing to furnish exclusionary re-
lief.180
These exceptions have generally struck commentators as 
liberty-reducing. After all, they deprive constitutional claimants 
of a remedy for violations of their rights, and they cause some 
future violations to go undeterred.
 
181 But these exceptions also 
further an important liberty-promoting goal. If we assume, not 
unrealistically, that features unique to the suppression-hearing 
context push judges to err on the side of not excluding evidence, 
then exceptions to the exclusionary remedy permit them to 
achieve this result without affecting the application of search-
and-seizure protections in other remedial environments. With 
no remedial exceptions in place, judges would be unable to deny 
exclusion unless they held that the government never violated 
the defendant’s rights. But when exceptions to the exclusionary 
remedy are available, judges may invoke these exceptions to 
uphold admission of probative evidence, while leaving unal-
tered the substantive content of the Fourth Amendment right 
itself. The result of the suppression hearing is the same, but its 
precedential effects are different, with the impact of a denial of 
relief running no further than the confines of the remedy it-
self.182
  
 
 
 177. Leon, 468 U.S. at 897. 
 178. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006). 
 179. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 
 180. See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2505–27 
(1996). 
 181. See Steiker, supra note 180, at 2534 (“[T]he police are very apt to 
‘hear’ the decision rules [i.e., remedial rules] that the Supreme Court makes 
(and that lower federal and state courts apply) and thus to adjust their atti-
tudes about what behavior ‘really’ is required by the Court’s conduct rules [i.e., 
substantive rules].”). 
 182. This is not to say that remedial exceptions to the exclusionary rule 
have resulted in an overall expansion of Fourth Amendment liberties; the 
point is only that the exceptions’ curtailment of Fourth Amendment liberties 
has been tempered by their remedy-specific scope. Cf. id. at 2511. 
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Other remedial exceptions do similar work. Professor John 
Jeffries has argued, for instance, that qualified immunity doc-
trine—which serves as a major exception to § 1983 damages li-
ability—helps to “reduce the cost of innovation, thereby advanc-
ing the growth and development of constitutional law.”183 
Professor Jeffries’s argument highlights the cross-temporal dy-
namics of constitutional adjudication: He aims to demonstrate 
how the qualified immunity defense promotes the adaption of 
constitutional rights to changing circumstances.184 His essential 
insight, however, also suggests how immunity rules can and do 
alleviate spillover across remedies: Qualified immunity doctrine 
targets not the law of rights but rather the law of remedies, 
and it thereby helps to shield other remedial environments 
from adverse spillover effects.185 A similar point holds with re-
spect to the non-retroactivity rule of Teague v. Lane and other 
“exceptions” to habeas corpus relief: if every expansion of every 
constitutional guarantee warranted full-scale retroactive reme-
diation, courts would seldom expand such guarantees to begin 
with.186
Remedial exceptions do not formally vary the content of 
substantive rules across different remedial settings. The same 
substantive definition of what constitutes probable cause ap-
plies, for instance, regardless of whether a trial court judge 
considers a suppression motion or a magistrate judge considers 
an application for a search warrant; the difference is just that 
additional hurdles must be cleared in order for the suppression 
remedy to issue, whereas the denial of a warrant application 
would follow automatically from a magistrate’s identification of 
fatal Fourth Amendment defects. At another level, though, re-
medial exceptions generate disaggregated substantive law, be-
cause they produce a world in which Fourth Amendment claims 
 But by denying collateral relief through the use of re-
medial exceptions—rather than the narrowing of substantive 
protections—courts can prevent remedy-specific considerations 
from shaping the cross-remedial content of substantive law.  
 
 183. Jeffries, Right-Remedy Gap, supra note 10, at 98. 
 184. See id. at 99–100. 
 185. See id. at 110–11. 
 186. See Jeffries, Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, supra note 10, at 
80. The same is true of AEDPA-based restrictions on federal court review of 
state court convictions, which require significant judicial deference to the con-
stitutional determinations of state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2012). 
AEDPA deference permits federal court judges to deny habeas relief without 
having to propound restrictive, cross-remedial principles of substantive law. 
See id. 
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capable of generating relief vary according to the type of relief 
being sought. The Fourth Amendment as applied in the exclu-
sionary setting permits police to enter homes without announc-
ing their presence, whereas the Fourth Amendment as applied 
in the § 1983 setting does not. Likewise, the Fourth Amend-
ment as applied in the exclusionary setting permits the unrea-
sonable acquisition of evidence that will be inevitably discov-
ered, whereas the Fourth Amendment as applied in the 
warrant-issuing setting does not. 
Similar points can be made about the disaggregating effect 
of other remedial exceptions. The harmless error rule, for in-
stance, renders evidentiary restrictions less exacting when they 
underlie requests for appellate relief than when they underlie 
requests for trial-level relief. Qualified immunity doctrine ren-
ders the First Amendment less protective when asserted in 
damages actions against individual public officials than when 
asserted as a defense to criminal prosecution. And the rules of 
non-retroactivity and AEDPA deference yield a far narrower 
set of operative substantive rights with bite in the habeas con-
text, as compared to the operative substantive rights with bite 
on direct appeal. 
In short, remedial exceptions mitigate spillover by severing 
the connection between a decision to withhold application of a 
remedy and the generation of substantive precedents with 
cross-remedial force. That is not to say that the invocation of 
such exceptions leaves the substantive right unaffected; much 
to the contrary, as we have seen, remedial exceptions carry sig-
nificant implications for the real-world efficacy of the substan-
tive right itself. But remedial exceptions carry these implica-
tions in a remedy-specific way, leaving unaltered (both formally 
and functionally) the substantive law as it applies in connection 
with other remedial rules. And that is the key to understanding 
how remedial exceptions alleviate spillover across remedies: 
the dynamics of a given remedial setting exert influences on 
the outcome of individual substantive cases; but remedial ex-
ceptions confine these influences to the particular remedial set-
ting that produces them. 
B. LIMITATIONS 
So is our work here done? Was all the above just a rounda-
bout way of saying that remedial exceptions have already 
solved the problem that provoked the writing of this Article in 
the first place? No. In their current form, many remedial excep-
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tions reveal their share of difficulties as anti-spillover devices. 
These difficulties, to be clear, are not an inescapable feature of 
remedial exceptions in the abstract; we can steer clear of the 
difficulties by modifying the exceptions on the books, rather 
than giving up altogether on the project of avoiding spillover 
through the strategic use of remedial exceptions. But most 
(though not all) remedial exceptions take the form of broad 
transsubstantive rules, and this in turn can create problems. In 
particular, a small set of broadly applicable exceptions will fail 
to capture the full range of scenarios in which judges might 
wish to inject disaggregation into the substantive law. And the 
transsubstantive nature of these exceptions means that judges 
can create such disaggregation only by creating new forms of 
spillover within the law of remedies itself.  
1. Inaptness 
Courts do not design remedial exceptions solely with the 
problem of cross-remedial spillover in mind. Other considera-
tions factor into the shaping of standards that dictate when 
remedial exceptions do and do not apply: When, as a practical 
matter, is it too difficult to furnish relief? What, if anything, do 
the relevant statutes say? Would other remedies be available to 
enforce a right if an exception precluded enforcement in this 
remedial context? And so forth. Many different—and some-
times countervailing—objectives must be considered in map-
ping out the conditions under which substantive violations 
trigger different kinds of remedial action by the courts. For this 
reason, a given remedial exception may not always work well in 
guarding against spillover across remedies.  
Consider, for instance, the harmless error rule. As we have 
already seen, harmless error analysis does not apply to so-
called “structural” errors, which trigger automatic reversal 
whenever they occur.187
 
 187. See discussion supra Part I.D. 
 If a court determines that a structural 
error at trial was too insignificant to warrant reversal of a con-
viction, the harmless error exception provides no help. The only 
way to avoid issuing the remedy is to declare, disingenuously, 
that no legal error ever occurred. Even beyond structural er-
rors, moreover, there remain problems. Harmless error analy-
sis focuses first and foremost on the variable of prejudice; it of-
fers no assistance to judges who wish to affirm convictions in 
the face of errors with prejudicial effects. Yet there may be cir-
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cumstances in which even prejudicial errors will strike judges 
as too insubstantial to warrant full-bore appellate relief. (Imag-
ine, for instance, that a trial judge has pushed the boundaries 
of a hearsay rule, admitting evidence that contributed to a ju-
ry’s finding of guilt but without offending any of the substan-
tive interests that the rule was intended to promote.) In these 
settings, harmless error analysis and its prejudice-based focus 
will still leave appellate judges reluctant to identify close-to-
the-borderline violations of the substantive law, even where the 
primary basis for their reluctance derives from considerations 
specific to the reversal remedy itself. 
Consider, too, damages relief under § 1983 liability. Under 
the status quo regime, qualified immunity doctrine provides 
the primary means by which courts can avoid imposing damag-
es on public officials, regardless of the particular type of claim 
asserted against them.188 Thus, for instance, had the Court 
wished to deny relief in Paul v. Davis without affecting the 
cross-remedial content of procedural due process doctrine (and 
without creating a new exception to the § 1983 damages reme-
dy), it could have invoked the qualified immunity exception. 
Rather than holding that the defendant did nothing wrong as a 
matter of procedural due process law, the Court could have dis-
posed of the case by declaring that the defendant never violated 
a clearly established constitutional right. But invoking qualified 
immunity in Paul would not have assuaged the Court’s con-
cerns about converting the Fourteenth Amendment into a “font 
of tort law.”189
Or, take the exclusionary remedy. Punctuated as it already 
is with exceptions, the remedial law of exclusion may still not 
 That alternative rendering of Paul would have 
left lower courts free to establish new procedural due process 
requirements in future Paul-like cases, and those require-
ments, once clearly established, would have empowered future 
§ 1983 plaintiffs to secure damages relief against public offi-
cials who ran afoul of them. A qualified immunity holding, in 
other words, would have worked to insulate the Paul defend-
ants from damages liability under § 1983, but not future de-
fendants in similar cases. Given what remedial exceptions were 
then at its disposal, the Court in Paul could thus have conclud-
ed that the only way to foreclose defamation-like tort actions 
under the Due Process Clause was to render a cross-remedial 
decision about the constitutional right itself. 
 
 188. See Jeffries, Right-Remedy Gap, supra note 10, at 89. 
 189. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). 
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accommodate the full range of circumstances in which a judge’s 
reluctance to exclude evidence renders her unwilling to declare 
that a violation of the law occurred. A search or seizure may 
not trigger any current exception to the exclusionary rule, but 
if the unlawfully obtained evidence is probative enough, the al-
leged violation insignificant-seeming enough, and the societal 
interest in securing a conviction strong enough, then a judge 
may still be looking for a way out of the troublesome task of 
furnishing relief. Under such circumstances, remedial excep-
tions will fail to prevent cross-remedial spillover; with no 
ready-made exception at the judge’s disposal, the likely out-
come of the case will be a declaration that the government at 
all times comported with the law. 
None of this is to say that the current smorgasbord of ex-
ceptions within these and other remedial environments is whol-
ly ineffective at mitigating spillover across remedies. Without 
these exceptions in place, the substantive protections of cross-
remedial law would be narrower than what the status quo pro-
vides. But utilizing the exceptions on the books to combat the 
particular problem of cross-remedial spillover can sometimes 
feel like trying to fit square pegs into round holes. The status 
quo regime presents courts with a small number of remedial 
exceptions designed to resolve a large number of very different 
cases; these exceptions may therefore fail to capture each and 
every instance in which the remedial dynamics of a case mili-
tate against the granting of relief. Consequently, even for rem-
edies with exceptions already attached to them, the threat of 
spillover remains.  
2. Transsubstantivity 
A further complication with remedial exceptions involves 
their generally transsubstantive character. Just as substantive 
rights tend to apply uniformly across remedies, so too does the 
law of remedies (including the remedial exceptions that belong 
to it) tend to apply uniformly across substantive rights. Quali-
fied immunity protections do not change depending on whether 
a § 1983 plaintiff alleges a Fourteenth Amendment violation or 
an Eighth Amendment violation;190
 
 190. See Fallon, Asking the Right Questions, supra note 
 the harmless error standard 
does not change depending on whether a trial court misapplies 
10, at 490; Jeffries, 
supra note 22, at 259. 
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the Fourth Amendment or the Fifth Amendment;191 and, with a 
few exceptions,192
Suppose, for instance, that on an appeal from a conviction, 
a criminal defendant argues that the trial judge unlawfully 
admitted some piece of hearsay testimony proffered by the 
prosecution. Suppose, moreover, that, while both the merits of 
the claim and the harmless error analysis present a close call, 
the appeals court panel feels strongly that the trial court’s al-
leged violation of the hearsay rule should not trigger the wind-
fall remedy of a new trial. The panel’s outlook on the case, in 
other words, stems from a mixture of remedy-based and sub-
stance-based considerations: the judges agree that the alleged 
violation of the hearsay rule—if in fact a violation—did not 
amount to a serious enough legal error to warrant the high re-
medial costs that a retrial would entail.  
 the same nonretroactivity restrictions on ha-
beas corpus relief apply across a wide variety of substantive 
claims. The transsubstantive nature of these and other remedi-
al exceptions further reduces their effectiveness at counteract-
ing cross-remedial spillover. 
Having made up its mind that it wants to affirm the con-
viction, the panel then asks how to reach this result. Should 
the panel hold that the trial judge’s admission of the hearsay 
testimony did not violate an evidentiary rule? Or should it hold 
that the admission of the hearsay testimony—whether or not 
erroneous—was harmless to the defendant? Much of what I’ve 
argued thus far would favor the latter route: The panel’s reluc-
tance to reverse derives from considerations unique to the con-
text of appellate review, so rejecting the claim on its merits 
would result in cross-remedial precedent that binds judges at 
both appellate-court and trial-court levels. All else equal, then, 
 
 191. The standard does change, however, depending on whether a defend-
ant asserts a constitutional or nonconstitutional claim. See Chapman v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 18, 20 (1967) (setting forth an elevated standard for harmless 
error review in connection with claims of a constitutional nature). Although I 
have elsewhere criticized this feature of the doctrine, my criticisms focus on 
the constitutional/nonconstitutional distinction itself, as opposed to the more 
general idea of varying harmless error requirements across different substan-
tive domains. See Michael Coenen, Constitutional Privileging, 99 VA. L. REV. 
683, 695–97 (2013). 
 192. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (withholding “new rule” 
requirement from “watershed” rulings of criminal procedure and laws that 
place “certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power 
of the criminal law to proscribe”); see also Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 
614, 620 (1998) (holding that Teague does not apply to decisions narrowing the 
scope of substantive criminal statutes). 
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the court would do better to affirm via the harmless error ex-
ception, thereby obviating the risk of spillover across remedies. 
All else, however, may not be equal. For if the panel de-
cides to invoke the harmless error rule, it runs the risk of creat-
ing spillover in a different direction: across rights. The harm-
less error rule, recall, is generally transsubstantive.193
To take one further example, suppose a habeas petitioner 
alleges that a recent Supreme Court decision entitles him to 
retroactive relief. The government disagrees, arguing (a) that 
the prior decision created a “new rule” under Teague and there-
fore cannot form the basis for any post-conviction attack; and 
(b) that even under the new Supreme Court precedent, the de-
fendant’s conviction was not the product of legal error. Suppose 
that both of these issues could go either way, but that the judge 
considering the habeas petition regards the claim as insuffi-
ciently important to warrant the high-cost remedy of habeas re-
lief. The same dilemma thus presents itself. The judge can deny 
the claim on its merits, but he will then be allowing considera-
tions specific to the habeas remedy to shape a precedent with 
application in other remedial contexts. But if the judge seeks 
refuge in the Teague rule, he will then be shaping a 
transsubstantive remedial rule (i.e., the law governing what 
qualifies as a “new rule” under Teague) by reference to consid-
erations specific to the particular substantive issue that the pe-
titioner has raised.
 Thus, in 
denying relief on harmless error grounds, the panel creates a 
new transsubstantive precedent concerning the law of harmless 
error, shaping the analysis that future appellate judges will 
apply in connection with different substantive claims. That is a 
problem insofar as the original reason for invoking the harm-
less error rule—and thus for contributing to the 
transsubstantive harmlessness standard—related to the sub-
stantive particularities of the defendant’s case. Considerations 
unique to one substantive rule shape a remedial precedent that 
attaches to many other substantive rules. 
194
 
 193. See supra notes 
 There will be spillover one way or the 
190–92 and accompanying text. 
 194. Consider, for instance, the Court’s recent decision in Chaidez v. Unit-
ed States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013), where it denied retroactive habeas relief to a 
petitioner whose counsel failed to advise her of the immigration consequences 
of pleading guilty to a federal crime (and thereby rendered ineffective assis-
tance of counsel under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010)). The Court 
held in Chaidez that its earlier decision in Padilla created a “new rule” of 
Sixth Amendment law and therefore could not form the basis for retroactive 
relief, notwithstanding strong doctrinal arguments to the contrary. See 
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other; the only thing left for the judge to decide is whether to 
channel it into the law of remedies or into the law of rights. 
We can generalize the point: Transsubstantive remedial 
exceptions facilitate the avoidance of spillover across remedies, 
but only at the expense of spillover across rights. When a 
court’s motivations to deny relief are mixed—that is, grounded 
in considerations specific to a remedial context and considera-
tions specific to a substantive claim—its invocation of a 
transsubstantive exception may therefore not always represent 
a viable anti-spillover strategy. The viability of the strategy 
will depend on the relative degree to which rights-related and 
remedy-related considerations factor into the court’s overall as-
sessment of a claimant’s demands. The court must essentially 
choose between the lesser of two evils: (a) cross-remedial spillo-
ver problems caused by a remedy-motivated denial of a sub-
stantive claim, and (b) transsubstantive spillover problems 
caused by a substance-motivated denial of a particular form of 
relief. In many cases, these harms will be difficult to calculate. 
And even where the harms can be calculated, a fully satisfacto-
ry doctrinal solution may still not emerge. 
C. BETTER DISAGGREGATION: BLENDING RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 
Nothing in these preceding sections suggests that remedial 
exceptions are inherently unable to combat spillover in an ef-
fective way. I have leveled my criticisms at existing features of 
existing exceptions, and responding to these criticisms would 
therefore not require us to abandon the project of crafting ex-
ceptions to remedial rules. Instead, it would require us to shape 
and apply these exceptions in a more substance-specific and 
finely tailored way.195
Notice, however, that the more finely-tailored and sub-
stance-specific our exceptions become, the harder it is to say 
 
 
Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1114–21 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). It is impossible to 
know precisely what motivated the Court to deny relief in Chaidez, but one 
cannot ignore that deeming Padilla “non-new” would have called into question 
a large number of pre-Padilla plea agreements entered into by immigrant de-
fendants. Insofar as this consideration (tethered to the Padilla right itself) 
motivated the Court to deem Padilla “non-new” for purposes of habeas relief, 
the Court would have allowed a substance-specific consideration to dictate the 
shape of a transsubstantive remedial holding, thereby yielding spillover across 
rights.  
 195. Although I am not the first to advocate for reducing the 
transsubstantivity of remedial rules, the prior work on point has not explicitly 
focused on the spillover-related benefits of doing so. See, e.g., Fallon, Asking 
the Right Questions, supra note 10, at 489; Jeffries, supra note 22, at 291–92. 
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with a straight face that these exceptions are not in fact vary-
ing the cross-remedial applicability of the substantive law. 
Functionally speaking, there is a vanishing difference between 
the act of layering multiple “substance-specific” remedial excep-
tions atop a formally uniform body of substantive law, and the 
act of declaring straight up that the dictates of the substantive 
law vary according to the remedial environment in which it ap-
plies. Where remedial exceptions are few in number and 
transsubstantive in breadth, we can more plausibly identify a 
conceptual separation between remedial and substantive rules: 
we define the remedy’s availability, theoretically at least, in 
terms that do not depend on substantive criteria, and we may 
therefore characterize the remedial inquiry as totally and com-
pletely independent of whatever the substantive law provides. 
(“All First Amendment requirements,” we can plausibly say, 
“are capable of generating monetary relief against individual 
defendants, but that relief is not available when those same 
First Amendment requirements have not been clearly estab-
lished.”). But where a remedial exception targets substance-
specific criteria, this no longer becomes the case. (It becomes 
almost internally contradictory to say something like: “All 
Fourth Amendment requirements are capable of generating ex-
clusionary relief, but exclusionary relief is not available when 
the Fourth Amendment requirement at issue is the knock-and-
announce requirement.”) 
That observation helps to demonstrate how what might 
seem to be a quite complex and radical project of reform can ac-
tually be achieved in a simple and gradual fashion. Proliferat-
ing exceptions within the remedial law and associating each 
exception with precise, substance-specific criteria may sound 
like a daunting task. But it is really just another way of de-
scribing a more candid and minimalist approach toward sub-
stantive lawmaking, which freely blends together the rights-
related and remedy-related elements of courts’ reasoning. 
When remedial variables motivate substantive outcomes, the 
trick is simply to register these motivating effects within the 
doctrine itself. Doing so will inject into the precedent a limiting 
principle that permits differentiation in outcomes according to 
differentiated remedial demands. We can characterize such a 
decision as creating a new “substance-specific exception” to the 
remedy being sought, or we can characterize it as creating a 
new, remedy-dependent rule of substantive law. How we char-
acterize the decision, though, is of far less significance than 
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what it allows us to achieve: a more disaggregated set of sub-
stantive norms that better resists spillover across remedies.196
A useful template for this sort of “blending” approach in-
volves the prior restraint rule of First Amendment doctrine. In 
simplified form, the rule calls for special First Amendment 
scrutiny of government efforts to secure before-the-fact injunc-
tions against would-be speakers, as compared to after-the-fact 
punishments on persons who have already spoken.
 
197 Though 
not without its detractors,198 this rule reflects a common and 
longstanding sentiment that pre-publication restraints on 
speech are “the most serious and the least tolerable infringe-
ment on First Amendment rights.”199 And were this sentiment 
not recognized by First Amendment doctrine, we might worry 
about its potential to create cross-remedial spillover.200 Cases 
involving injunctions against speech would—due to the pres-
ence of a pre-speech injunction—generate rules of strict First 
Amendment protection, which would then limit the govern-
ment’s use of less offensive remedies to regulate speech of a 
similar character. But the prior restraint rule blocks this out-
come. By reifying the idea that pre-publication injunctions 
against speech receive especially strict First Amendment re-
view, the prior restraint rule ensures that the precedential ef-
fects of prior restraint cases will not run beyond the prior re-
straint context. Spillover is avoided—and disaggregation 
achieved—by nothing more than a candid judicial acknowledg-
ment that substantive and remedial considerations should be 
blended together in a special way.201
 
 196. One potential consequence of the characterization we adopt, which I 
bracket here, involves constitutional rights and remedies. Insofar as some 
remedies for constitutional harms are grounded in nonconstitutional rules of 
statutory (or common) law, then substance-specific rules of “remedial” law 
might be amendable by statute, whereas remedy-specific rules of constitution-
al law would not be. 
 
 197. See Marin Scordato, Distinction Without a Difference: A Reappraisal of 
the Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (1989). 
 198. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 
409 (1983); William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process: 
Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Re-
straint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 245 (1982); Scordato, supra note 197. 
 199. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). 
 200. I am grateful to Geof Stone for bringing this point to my attention. 
 201. Other examples from the First Amendment context reveal an analo-
gous approach to the spillover problem. In some areas of free-speech doctrine, 
courts have employed a “penalty-sensitive” approach to First Amendment 
analysis, reflecting the assumption that, all else equal, the harmfulness of a 
speech prohibition rises with the harshness of the penalty attached to it. See 
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The prior restraint rule thus represents the sort of “reme-
dial exception” that effectively targets spillover across reme-
dies. It is particularized and substance-specific. It blends to-
gether substance-based and remedy-based considerations. It 
therefore yields holdings that apply in free-speech cases involv-
ing pre-publication injunctions, but not in cases involving other 
speech-related remedies or other injunction-related rights. 
With the rule in place, the risk of cross-remedial spillover di-
minishes, as does the spillover risk produced by the blunt and 
transsubstantive remedial exceptions on which courts might 
otherwise end up relying. Clearly, moreover, the prior restraint 
rule “disaggregates” First Amendment law. It causes the 
strength of a speaker’s First Amendment claims to fluctuate 
with the sort of remedy involved in the speaker’s case, even 
keeping constant the content and societal value of the speech 
itself. And all of that is achieved through the courts’ frank and 
explicit acknowledgment that a particular remedy has affected 
their outlook on a substantive claim.  
Can courts achieve similar forms of disaggregation within 
other areas of the substantive law? The next Section considers 
that possibility. 
D. THE BLENDING STRATEGY APPLIED 
Consider first the Court’s decisions in Washington v. Da-
vis202 and Paul v. Davis.203 Both decisions alluded to remedy-
related reasons for rejecting the plaintiffs’ substantive claims. 
Neither decision, however, ended up yielding the sort of dis-
aggregated law that one might have expected to develop. The 
Court in Washington v. Davis fretted about the intrusiveness 
and complexity of structural reforms to the welfare state, and it 
cited these difficulties as a reason for ratcheting up the difficul-
ty of demonstrating equal protection violations.204
 
Michael Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions: Toward a Penalty-Sensitive Ap-
proach to the First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 991 (2012). By making 
explicit the connection between penalty severity and First Amendment validi-
ty, the Court helps to prevent variables specific to the nature of one penalty 
from dictating the First Amendment doctrine that governs in cases involving 
very different penalties. 
 The Court in 
Paul v. Davis similarly fretted about the debilitating effects of 
damages actions against public officials, and it cited these ef-
fects as a reason to deny procedural due process protections to 
 202. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 203. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
 204. Washington, 426 U.S. at 248. 
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claimants suffering government-induced reputational harms.205
The better course of action in these cases would have been 
to identify the remedy-specific elements of the legal analysis 
and—critically—to leave open the possibility of different sub-
stantive outcomes in alternative remedial settings. Having not-
ed that special features of the damages remedy rendered it less 
receptive to the substantive claim, the Court in Paul v. Davis 
should have gone on to hold that its “stigma plus” rule might or 
might not warrant application in cases where damages were 
not at issue. Having expressed its concerns about reallocating 
public resources via structural injunctions, the Court in Wash-
ington v. Davis should likewise have left open the possibility 
that equal protection claimants might satisfy a lesser standard 
when not seeking civil relief. Precisely what the law would 
have looked like in these other remedial environments need not 
have been decided then and there; rather, the Court should 
simply have identified a remedy-specific influence on its sub-
stantive holding while taking care not to imply that the holding 
controlled within other remedial settings. 
 
Both analyses thus flirted with a blending together of remedy-
related and rights-related reasoning. In the end, however, they 
failed to produce meaningful cross-remedial variations in the 
substantive law. 
A similar point obtains with respect to hybrid statutes. 
Both Chiarella206 and the Court’s holding in Thompson/Center 
Arms207 suffered from a judicial unwillingness to disaggregate 
by blending. When implementing Rule 10b-5 in civil cases, both 
the Supreme Court and lower courts failed to highlight the 
linkage between the non-criminal nature of the remedies 
sought and the expansive substantive holdings that these rul-
ings embodied. Consequently, when Chiarella presented the 
question whether the Rule permitted criminal insider trading 
prosecutions, the prior on-point precedents obscured from view 
an important potential basis for distinguishing them away. And 
while the Thompson/Center Arms Court did in fact 
acknowledge a remedial influence on its holding, its rigid ad-
herence to cross-remedial uniformity placed it in the awkward 
position of following the rule of lenity in a case with nothing 
more than a $200 tax refund at stake.208
 
 205. Paul, 424 U.S. at 701. 
 The Court could have 
 206. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 207. United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505 (1992). 
 208. Id. at 518. 
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better managed the spillover problem by resolving the statuto-
ry issue in Thompson/Center Arms on narrower grounds, while 
emphasizing the remedy-dependent nature of the holding it 
had rendered. That way, Thompson/Center Arms could have 
achieved an optimal substantive result with respect to civil en-
forcement of the National Firearms Act without interfering 
with future courts’ handling of criminal cases under the NFA. 
The Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Plaza 
Health Laboratories, Inc. reveals what a more disaggregated 
approach to hybrid statutes might look like.209 The employee of 
a private laboratory had dumped vials of blood into the Hudson 
River, and the government sought to prosecute him for know-
ingly discharging pollutants in violation of the Clean Water Act 
(CWA).210 The liability question turned on whether the dumper 
of the vials qualified as a “point source” of pollutants under the 
CWA.211 (Suffice it to say that the statute’s definition of the 
term—”any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, in-
cluding but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, con-
duit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrat-
ed animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, 
from which pollutants are or may be discharged”212 rendered 
the answer to this question nonobvious.) And in case the statu-
tory question wasn’t already complicated enough, the CWA 
subjected “point source” discharges to both civil and criminal 
forms of redress, thus presenting another variant on the hybrid 
statute dilemma.213
The Second Circuit dealt with this conundrum just as it 
should have, by blending together the substantive and remedial 
elements of its reasoning. Having consulted the statutory text 
and legislative history, it concluded that the interpretive ques-
tion presented no obvious answer.
 
214
Since the government’s reading of the statute in this case founders on 
our inability to discern the obvious intention of the legislature to in-
clude a human being as a “point source”, we conclude that the crimi-
nal provisions of the CWA did not clearly proscribe Villegas’s conduct 
and did not accord him fair warning of the sanctions the law placed 
 It then explained: 
 
 209. 3 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 210. Id. at 644. 
 211. Id. at 644–45. 
 212. Id. at 645 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012)). 
 213. Id. at 646–47. 
 214. Id. at 649. 
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on that conduct. Under the rule of lenity, therefore, the prosecutions 
against him must be dismissed.215
And so, Villegas won his case, but not by way of a decision 
establishing that the term “point source” excluded human be-
ings for any and all remedial purposes. Rather, he won the case 
by way of a holding that drew together substantive and reme-
dial considerations to produce a remedy-specific substantive 
rule: As the Second Circuit made clear, the CWA’s lack of clari-
ty, acting in concert with the rule of lenity, precluded the gov-
ernment from criminally punishing humans as point sources.
 
216 
Nothing in the court’s holding, however, barred anyone from 
seeking civil relief under the CWA against polluters like Ville-
gas.217 The court determined that the statute wasn’t clear 
enough to warrant criminal prosecution, but the court left open 
the question whether the “humans are point sources” argument 
might carry the day in a civil enforcement action.218
Consider, finally, Fourth Amendment probable cause de-
terminations. In Illinois v. Gates, the Court characterized the 
probable cause inquiry as presenting a “commonsense, practical 
question,”
 Plaza 
Health Laboratories thus succeeded where both Thomp-
son/Center Arms and Chiarella failed. Thus, while Villegas’s 
bloody vials may well have spilled beyond the Hudson, the 
precedential effects of his case did not spill beyond the bounda-
ries of the criminal law. 
219 to be governed by an “assessment of probabilities 
in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, re-
duced to a neat set of legal rules.”220 In addition, the Court 
stressed the need for “great deference” to a magistrate’s proba-
ble cause determinations, explaining that courts should not 
“invalidate warrants by interpreting affidavits in a 
hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner.”221
 
 215. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
 Put 
another way, magistrates get to employ an indefinite standard 
 216. See id. 
 217. Indeed, the court went out of its way to distinguish several civil cases 
involving the scope of the CWA’s “point source” requirement, explaining that 
such cases had arisen in “civil-penalty or licensing settings, where greater 
flexibility of interpretation to further remedial legislative purposes is permit-
ted, and the rule of lenity does not protect a defendant against statutory am-
biguities.” Id. at 648. 
 218. Cf. id. at 650 (characterizing the decision as “[c]ompelled by the rule of 
lenity”). 
 219. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983). 
 220. Id. at 232. 
 221. Id. at 236 (citations and alterations omitted). 
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while enjoying deferential review. The consequence, as Profes-
sor Stuntz explained, is a remedial arrangement that permits 
magistrates (on the one hand) and higher level judges (on the 
other) to apply what in effect amount to “different stand-
ards”222
Stuntz suggested that this arrangement should be regard-
ed as sensible and unproblematic from the perspective of those 
who worry about hindsight bias in suppression hearings.
—standards whose differences derive from the different 
substantive influences that their remedial environments pre-
sent. 
223
 
 
More than that, the arrangement might count as positively 
beneficial. The Gates approach allows for higher-ranking courts 
to uphold magistrates’ probable cause determinations without 
creating new law that binds below. The precedents generated 
in suppression hearings, in other words, will generally concern 
remedy-specific principles of deference, rather than cross-
remedial principles of Fourth Amendment law. Consequently, 
trial courts may deny Fourth Amendment claims without in-
flicting collateral damage on the substantive standards that 
magistrates apply.  
*   *   * 
 
To recap the argument thus far: Remedies influence rights. 
Rights apply across remedies. Distortions thus arise when a 
particular remedy influences the scope of a substantive rule, 
which then imports the remedy-specific influence into other 
remedial environments. I have argued that the best way to at-
tack the spillover problem is by varying rights’ application 
across different remedial contexts. To some extent, this is what 
courts already do. By utilizing exceptions to remedial rules, 
courts create ways for themselves to grant some but not other 
forms of relief in response to otherwise identical substantive 
claims. Even so, courts can do a better job, by rendering the ex-
ceptions they apply more nuanced in definition and less 
transsubstantive in scope. That can often be accomplished by 
acknowledging directly the remedial elements underlying a 
substantive holding, thus assigning to that holding a preceden-
tial impact that extends no further than the remedial context 
in which it was rendered. 
 
 222. Stuntz, supra note 12, at 928. 
 223. See id. (“[T]here is . . . no need to constrain the warrant process with a 
detailed body of law.”). 
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That may be all fine and good from the perspective of the 
spillover problem itself. But before we give a thumbs-up to the 
hidden modes of disaggregation that remedial exceptions facili-
tate, and to the more explicit forms of disaggregation that ex-
plicit right-remedy blending would create, we should ask 
whether the disaggregation strategy fits comfortably within the 
broader legal framework of public law adjudication. Put anoth-
er way, even if we have proven it an effective means of combat-
ing the spillover problem, we must still ask whether the dis-
aggregation strategy comports with basic values and priorities 
of the legal system writ large. 
IV.  IS DISAGGREGATION PROPER?   
I see four major objections to the strategy of disaggregating 
substantive norms across remedial boundaries. The first objec-
tion holds that the disaggregation strategy does not reflect the 
unitary nature of the legal texts from which substantive rules 
derive. The second objection holds that the disaggregation 
strategy undesirably complicates the law. A third objection (re-
lated to the second) holds that disaggregating rights across 
remedies undermines important values associated with the 
law’s generality. And a fourth objection holds that certain 
(though not all) forms of disaggregation will frustrate higher-
level courts’ ability to supervise the work of their lower-level 
counterparts. I address these four objections in turn, conclud-
ing that while each has some merit, none offers a fatal case 
against disaggregation as a response to cross-remedial spillo-
ver. 
A. CONCEPTUAL CONCERNS 
How can the same rule mean different things depending on 
the remedial setting in which courts interpret it? The Constitu-
tion does not contain one Fourth Amendment for suppression 
hearings and another for probable cause hearings. It does not 
contain one Due Process Clause for injunctive relief and anoth-
er for damages relief. And hybrid statutes do not (by definition) 
provide for differentiated substantive protections in different 
remedial settings. Recognizing these realities may seem to pose 
a formidable obstacle to an anti-spillover strategy grounded in 
applying rights differently depending on the remedy that is 
sought. If the texts we interpret are unitary, then it would 
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seem that our interpretations of those texts must be uniform.224
The problem with this argument lies in its failure to dis-
tinguish between two types of problems that judges confront: 
(1) higher-level problems of legal interpretation; and (2) lower-
level problems of legal implementation.
 
The “oneness” of such texts, in other words, counsels against 
assigning different substantive rules to different remedial set-
tings. 
225 Not every doctrinal 
dispute concerns the “meaning” of a legal text; many such dis-
putes operate closer to the ground, focusing on how legal provi-
sions, their meaning once gleaned, apply to discrete individual 
requests for judicial relief. Constitutional lawyers have long 
understood this point. As Professor Richard Fallon has ex-
plained, although it is true that “the Court must craft doctrine 
in light of judgments about what the Constitution means,” it is 
also true that “determinations of constitutional meaning do not 
always, or perhaps even typically, dictate with full precision 
what constitutional doctrine ought to be.”226 Indeed, much doc-
trine exists not so much to resolve “uncertainty about which 
values the Constitution encompasses and how protected values 
should be specified,”227
 
 224. See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 
 but rather for the less grandiose—but 
vitally important—purpose of “implement[ing]” the values once 
73, at 1031 (defending “core principle” of 
uniform meaning by reference to the fact that Congress would have specified 
different levels of enforcement for hybrid statutes if that’s what it had intend-
ed). 
 225. Some scholars use the term “construction” rather than “implementa-
tion.” See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinc-
tion, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 95 (2010). 
 226. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: 
Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 67 (1997) (emphasis 
added). Professor Fallon’s statement is true in at least two different senses. 
First, constitutional meaning may fail to dictate a particular outcome of a par-
ticular case. Even a full understanding of a provision’s semantic content, in 
other words, may still leave us unable to say with certainty whether a given 
constitutional claim should succeed or fail. Second, constitutional meaning 
may sometimes suggest outcomes in cases that—for pragmatic reasons—
courts may nonetheless decline to dictate. Hence arises the suggestion of Pro-
fessor Fallon (and that of several other scholars) that courts sometimes 
overenforce and/or underenforce constitutional norms, generating doctrinal 
results that do not directly follow from what the constitutional text would 
seem to require. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 
Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1975); 
Sager, supra note 23; David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 
U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 192 (1988). 
 227. Fallon, supra note 226, at 56. 
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specified.228 Similar insights animate Professor Mitchell Ber-
man’s work on “constitutional decision rules”—the large body of 
presumptions, evidentiary burdens, balancing tests, means-end 
analyses, and other doctrinal creations that permeate judge-
made constitutional law.229 “Much of existing constitutional 
doctrine,” he argues, “is better understood not as judicial 
statements of constitutional meaning (i.e., as constitutional op-
erative propositions) but rather as judicial directions regarding 
how courts should decide whether such operative propositions 
have been satisfied.”230
Mapping the doctrinal landscape in this way helps to 
demonstrate why variations in substantive doctrine need not 
reflect variations in textual meaning. Some constitutional cas-
es—often of the blockbuster variety—require courts to speak in 
terms of what Professor Berman calls “operative proposi-
tions”
 
231 of constitutional law (e.g., the Fourteenth Amendment 
governs affirmative action; the First Amendment governs cam-
paign finance regulation; the Commerce Clause restricts Con-
gress’s ability to regulate economic “inactivity,” etc.), and it 
would be odd indeed to encounter cross-remedial variations in 
holdings stated at such high levels of generality. But in many 
constitutional cases, the content of the operative proposition is 
not at issue; what matters instead is how the proposition trans-
lates into real-world judicial outcomes. And in these sorts of 
cases, the unitary nature of the text provides no good reason for 
maintaining absolute substantive uniformity across different 
remedial environments. By employing a conceptual apparatus 
that “[c]leav[es] meaning from rules”—as Professor Jennifer 
Laurin has put it—courts can vary rules without destabilizing 
meaning.232
This is not to say that it will always be easy to distinguish 
between questions of overarching meaning and questions of 
implementation, or that we can cleanly articulate the difference 
between “operative constitutional propositions” and “constitu-
tional decision rules.” Some might say, for instance, that Wash-
ington v. Davis’s holding goes to the core meaning of the Equal 
 
 
 228. Id. at 62. 
 229. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 
8–11 (2004) (discussing various aspects of judicially-created constitutional doc-
trine). 
 230. Id. at 12. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Laurin, supra note 13, at 1014 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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Protection Clause, while others might be more inclined to view 
the holding as a setting forth a “decision rule” about the evi-
dentiary burdens that equal protection claimants bear. Still 
others would regard these distinctions as pointless, instead 
maintaining that “the meaning of a constitutional provision is 
its implementation”—nothing less and nothing more.233 Concep-
tual disagreements aside,234
So much for constitutional enactments; what about their 
nonconstitutional counterparts? Here, the conceptual argument 
against cross-remedial variation might pack a bigger punch. 
With modern-day statutes, as opposed to ancient constitutional 
provisions, one can more easily resort to the claim that if “Con-
gress intends distinctions between different forms of enforce-
ment under a hybrid statute, it can simply write them into the 
statutory text.”
 however, the critical point remains: 
Remedy-based variations in substantive doctrine need not cre-
ate tension with the unitary nature of the enactments from 
which they derive. 
235 And the proponent of uniformity can often 
wield alluring expressio unius arguments as well. In some hy-
brid statutes, Congress has specified that particular substan-
tive norms ought to apply differently depending on the remedi-
al setting in which they operate.236 From these statutes, one 
might infer that Congress considered—and rejected—the possi-
bility of permitting cross-remedial variations other than those 
directly manifested by the text itself.237 It is no surprise then 
that the Supreme Court recently characterized as “novel” and 
“dangerous” the idea that “judges can give the same statutory 
text different meanings in different cases.”238
Even with respect to statutes, however, it is far from clear 
that the conceptual claim for uniformity supports a categorical 
prohibition on substantive variation across remedies. To begin 
 
 
 233. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Pragmatist’s View of Constitutional Imple-
mentation and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 173, 175 (2006) 
(alteration in original), available at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/ 
pdf/hills.pdf. 
 234. We can put this conceptual disagreement to the side, I believe, be-
cause the pragmatist position that constitutional meaning is always equiva-
lent to constitutional implementation is not likely to accompany the affirma-
tively non-pragmatist belief that constitutional meaning, so defined, must 
maintain formal uniformity across remedial boundaries. 
 235. Sachs, supra note 73, at 1031. 
 236. See id. at 1032 (explaining that the Exchange Act possesses “an intent 
requirement for criminal actions that does not apply to civil actions”). 
 237. Id. at 1031. 
 238. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378, 386 (2005). 
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with, as Professor Jonathan Siegel has shown, the Court’s re-
cent admonitions about the “novelty” and “dangerousness” of 
varying the scope of statutory commands from one context to 
another are belied by many of its earlier pronouncements, 
which have attached “multiple meanings” to “a single term or 
phrase in a single statutory provision” depending on the factual 
or remedial setting in which it is applied.239 In addition, not-
withstanding the tendency of courts and commentators to asso-
ciate statutory cases with “interpretative” problems, the “deci-
sion rules” insight seems no less applicable to statutory rules 
than to constitutional rules. With statutes, as with the Consti-
tution, we need not discern any and all variations in the sub-
stantive doctrine as registering multiple “interpretations” or 
“meanings” of a single textual provision; rather, we may char-
acterize them as registering multiple implementation strate-
gies for a provision whose semantic content—or “operative 
proposition”—remains fixed.240
Return to the example of Plaza Health Laboratories.
 And finally, arguments of the “if 
they’d meant it, they’d have said it” variety have a question-
begging quality to them. Congress can just as easily prohibit 
non-uniform enforcement of hybrid statutes as it can permit 
such enforcement, so why should we infer anything at all from 
the absence of express guidance one way or the other? Rather 
than speculate as to what Congress did or did not mean to 
communicate via its failure to articulate how a single statutory 
provision should apply across remedial boundaries, courts 
might simply try their best to forge practical doctrinal respons-
es to questions that were in reality unaddressed in the drafting 
process. 
241 The 
Clean Water Act had prescribed a single definition for a term 
(“point source”) with operative effect in civil and criminal cas-
es.242
 
 239. See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial 
Role in Statutory Interpretation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 339, 341 (2005); see also Aa-
ron Greene Liederman, Agency Polymorphism, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 781 (2009) 
(exploring similar idea in connection with administrative law). 
 In light of the definition’s unitary structure, the skeptical 
reader might ask, can it really be contended that Congress 
wanted courts to embrace differing definitions of the term ac-
cording to nature of the remedy being sought? Framed in these 
 240. Cf. Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-
Construction Distinction in Patent Law, 123 YALE L.J. 533, 562–72 (2013) (ap-
plying framework to courts’ enforcement of patent claims). 
 241. See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 242. See discussion supra Part III.D. 
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terms, the question may seem to demand a negative answer. 
But there is another way to conceptualize what the Second Cir-
cuit did in the case. The court did not choose one definition of 
“point source” over another; it simply applied an uncertain def-
inition in a way that took into account the heightened set of 
liberty interests presented by the criminal remedies being 
sought.243
B. ADMINISTRABILITY CONCERNS 
 Where the definitional guidance “ran out,” in other 
words, the Court resolved the case by reference to contextual 
features specific to the criminal prosecution before it. In so do-
ing, however, the Court took care to prevent its holding from 
dictating the outcome of separate cases where these same con-
textual features were lacking (i.e., civil suits under the Clean 
Water Act). So construed, the Second Circuit’s decision in Plaza 
Health Laboratories ought to seem no more strange or contro-
versial than any number of other “minimalist” judicial deci-
sions, which take care to confine the application of their hold-
ings to the particular set of circumstances that justify the 
holdings themselves.  
A more significant objection to the disaggregation strategy 
sounds in worries about complexity and administrability. On a 
simplified model of the status quo regime, courts enforce a fi-
nite number of rights by way of a finite number of remedies. To 
evaluate a given claim for relief, they refer first to a discrete 
body of substantive law, whose content does not formally de-
pend on the remedy being sought, and then to a discrete body of 
remedial law, whose content does not formally depend on the 
right being invoked. Adjudicating matters in this way produces 
substantial informational shortcuts for judges and litigants 
alike. If the law contains N different rights and M different 
remedies, courts can handle N x M right-remedy combinations 
by reference to N + M bodies of law. That is, courts and liti-
gants can sequentially employ a small number of substantive 
and remedial doctrines (e.g., First Amendment law, Second 
Amendment law, the law of injunctions, the law of damages) to 
resolve a much larger number of potential right-remedy re-
quests (e.g., a demand for injunctions as redress for a Second 
Amendment violation, a demand for damages as a redress for a 
First Amendment violation, a demand for exclusion as a re-
dress for a Fourth Amendment violation, and so on). If we have 
 
 243. See Plaza Health Lab., Inc. v. Villegas, 3 F.3d 643, 649 (1993). 
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ten different substantive rules, enforceable via five different 
remedial rules, then fifteen bodies of doctrine provide all the 
guidance we need. In contrast, a fully disaggregated regime 
could produce as many as fifty different “right-remedy” bodies 
of law to govern the same set of cases. 
At its endmost extreme, my call for disaggregated substan-
tive law would substantially increase the number of different 
doctrines that judges must create and lawyers must learn. No 
longer could a request for damages under the First Amendment 
be resolved by reference to a single cross-remedial rule of First 
Amendment doctrine and a single transsubstantive rule of 
§ 1983 doctrine. Courts would instead consult a specialized, 
self-contained area of “First Amendment damages” doctrine, 
which would exist alongside thousands of other self-contained 
bodies of “right-remedy” law. It takes no great leap of imagina-
tion to envision the confusion, complexity, and frustration that 
such an arrangement might yield. Is that a price worth paying 
for the sole sake of mitigating spillover? 
Probably not. But we need not frame the issue as present-
ing an all-or-nothing choice. Instead of asking whether we 
should permit total disaggregation of the substantive law or no 
disaggregation at all, we should simply ask whether judges 
might sometimes adapt substantive rules to particular remedial 
contexts as a means of attacking spillover. The relevant in-
quiry, in other words, involves the extent to which judges 
should vary substantive requirements according to remedial 
demands, rather than the propriety or non-propriety of their 
doing so on an unrestrained, wholesale basis. Indeed, one of the 
great virtues of the disaggregation strategy is its ability to ac-
commodate a substantial amount of fine-tuning. One can, for 
example, disaggregate First Amendment prior restraint law 
from First Amendment subsequent punishment law, while still 
ensuring that most key substantive principles of free speech 
doctrine remain constant across each. And one can tolerate 
some amount of variance between higher and lower courts in 
the application of “structural” trial rights, while still adhering 
to a core set of requirements that both lower courts and higher 
courts must enforce. Much more so than the “non-
disaggregation” strategies discussed in Part II, the disaggrega-
tion strategy permits judges to tailor the degree and character 
of their disaggregating solutions according to the degree and 
character of the spillover problems they confront. Rather than 
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“missiles to kill mice,” the disaggregation strategy offers 
mousetraps. 
The question then becomes how much disaggregation we 
should tolerate. At its core, this question presents yet another 
variant on the rules-standards tradeoff.244
My goal here is not to prescribe the optimal degree of dis-
aggregation that the spillover problem demands. Such a pre-
scription—in addition to implicating the deep divides of the 
rules/standards dilemma—would likely depend on a host of 
contextual factors that will vary according to the particular 
rights being disaggregated and the particular remedies across 
which the disaggregation occurs. That said, fears of chaotic 
complexity need not compel a complete rejection of disaggrega-
tion as an anti-spillover strategy. This is not to say that con-
cerns about elaborateness and unworkability do not matter. No 
doubt, they reflect an important consideration that any re-
sponse to the spillover problem must take into account. But 
these fears are not reasons in themselves to eschew disaggrega-
tion altogether. 
 Cross-remedial uni-
formity in the substantive law promotes simplicity, predictabil-
ity, low decision costs, and so forth; cross-remedial variation 
promotes adaptability, nuance, and fewer distortions in the 
law. How far we want to take the disaggregation strategy de-
pends largely on where we fall on the rules/standards spec-
trum. The more we like rules, the less we will want to dis-
aggregate; the more we like standards, the more we will look to 
do so. 
C. RULE-OF-LAW CONCERNS 
A related objection to this project might charge that the 
disaggregation of substantive norms puts judges on a slippery 
slope toward the eventual abandonment of important rule-of-
law values. Law, it is said, succeeds as a fair and just means of 
governance when its commands are generally applicable,245
 
 244. On the omnipresence of rules/standards problems, see generally Pierre 
Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985). 
 
thus satisfying what Lon Fuller called the “first desideratum of 
 245. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 46–48 (1964) (identi-
fying generality as an essential feature of a legal system); Kent Greenawalt, 
The Rule of Law and the Exemption Strategy, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1513, 1514 
(2009) (“[R]ules must be general, not directed at specific cases . . . .”); Antonin 
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1185 
(1989) (“[T]he establishment of broadly applicable rules is an essential compo-
nent of the judicial process . . . .”).  
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a system for subjecting human conduct to the governance of 
rules.”246
No one, I suspect, would argue that all forms of cross-
remedial disaggregation pose an existential challenge to our le-
gal order. Employing one set of substantive rules for criminal 
cases and another for civil cases, for example, would reduce the 
generality of substantive doctrine, but not in a way that would 
provoke anxieties about the rule of law’s collapse. (Criminal 
and civil cases, after all, have for hundreds of years employed 
different standards of proof and different mens rea rules with-
out the sky falling down.) But “remedies” and “remedial envi-
ronments” can be defined at higher and lower levels of detail, 
and the higher the levels of detail become, the less law-like 
cross-remedial distinctions may begin to look. Simple distinc-
tions across, say, “criminal” and “civil” remedies, or “monetary” 
and “injunctive” remedies, would inject differentiation into the 
substantive law without undermining its law-like character. 
But as the distinctions are defined with greater specificity, the 
threat to rule-of-law values intensifies. Judges, we might all 
agree, can safeguard generality while varying the substantive 
law across cases involving damage awards and cases involving 
injunctive relief. But what about varying it across cases involv-
ing “high” damage awards and cases involving “low” damage 
awards? Across cases involving “high damage awards sought 
against poor defendants” and cases involving “high damage 
awards sought against rich defendants”? Across cases involving 
“high damage awards sought against poor defendants with in-
surance” and cases involving “high damage awards sought 
against poor defendants without insurance”? We could continue 
this exercise ad nauseam until the operative “remedial envi-
ronment” of a given case boiled down to little more than its 
unique set of facts. At that point, judges would no longer be ap-
plying “law” in any meaningful sense. Rather, they would be 
 In addition to keeping doctrine administrable and 
comprehensible, the law’s generality helps to ensure that “like 
parties get treated alike” and that cases get resolved (and eval-
uated) by reference to objective and non-manipulable criteria, 
rather than the idiosyncrasies of individual judges. Disaggre-
gating the law, by definition, makes the law’s articulation more 
nuanced, less general, and more context-dependent. As a result, 
disaggregation might seem unfaithful to the project of having a 
legal system in the first place. 
 
 246. FULLER, supra note 245, at 46. 
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resolving individual cases in accordance with whatever they 
perceived justice to demand. 
The takeaway from this point is not that we give up on the 
project of alleviating cross-remedial spillover. Rather, it is that 
courts must recognize some cut-off point to the level of detail at 
which they distinguish remedies from one another. I cannot say 
precisely where on the spectrum that cut-off point lies, but it 
seems to me that we are not yet there. The substantive doctrine 
of today—which, as we have seen, tends to apply uniformly 
across even broadly-defined remedial categories—seems capa-
ble of absorbing significantly more differentiation across reme-
dies while still maintaining its law-like character. Courts may 
therefore continue to employ disaggregation strategies in re-
sponse to the spillover problem without giving rule-of-law pro-
ponents much cause for concern.  
That being said, the rule-of-law objection does provide rea-
son to temper our expectations about what disaggregation can 
achieve. Spillover in one form or another will inevitably occur 
as a consequence of developing generally applicable rules via 
case-specific adjudication. We can isolate holdings and differen-
tiate across remedial variables so as to limit potential cross-
remedial spillover effects. But even when we have done this, 
the factual particularities of one case might still yield substan-
tive rules that “spill over” into other factual contexts that 
would not have otherwise produced them. If an especially win-
some defendant raises a borderline Fourth Amendment claim, 
his especially winsome nature might compel a court to vindi-
cate his claim and thereby create a precedent that dictates the 
outcome of cases against less winsome defendants. An unusual-
ly complicated request for injunctive relief might prompt judges 
to deny recognition of a substantive claim and thereby create 
precedent governing cases involving simpler injunctive re-
quests.247 We can keep on trying to cabin the results of these 
cases to the particular factual settings that produced them, but 
at some point we will have to resist these urges lest we throw 
in the towel on maintaining generally applicable rules of law.248
 
 247. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 
883, 900–05 (2006) (noting ways in which the idiosyncratic features of a single 
case influence holdings that then govern a wider range of cases). 
  
 248. For example, the Court’s stipulation in Bush v. Gore that its analysis 
was “limited to the present circumstances,” 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000), has right-
ly struck many observers as unfaithful to rule-of-law values. See, e.g., Jona-
than F. Mitchell, Reconsidering Murdock: State-Law Reversals as Constitu-
tional Avoidance, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1335, 1380 (2010) (noting that this 
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This Article, however, has neither promised nor advocated 
spillover’s total eradication. Rather, it has sought to identify a 
particular form of spillover—spillover across remedies—whose 
reduction seems feasible and worth pursuing. Generality is a 
good thing. But even in good things we can partake too much. 
Just because the virtues of generality preclude us from achiev-
ing total success in the battle against spillover does not mean 
that we should give up on achieving any such success at all. To 
the contrary, as I hope this Article has shown, substantial—
though not total—success in the battle against spillover lies 
within our reach. 
D. THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF VERTICAL SPILLOVER 
Some forms of spillover occur across remedial settings at 
different levels of the judicial hierarchy. I have suggested, for 
instance, that trial judges who conduct suppression hearings 
may be less inclined to invalidate a search ex post than magis-
trate judges would be to prohibit the same search ex ante.249 
Similarly, I have suggested that appellate judges may be more 
reluctant to sustain post-trial allegations of structural error 
than trial judges confronting such errors as they arise.250
 But disaggregation in response to vertical spillover pre-
sents a special problem. Higher-level courts are supposed to 
supervise the work of their lower-level counterparts, and verti-
cal disaggregation will undermine their ability to exercise over-
sight. The more often that higher courts combine loosely de-
fined substantive standards with principles of deference on 
 These 
forms of “vertical spillover” can be met with disaggregating re-
sponses. Courts might invoke exceptions to “higher-level” judi-
cial remedies, such as by denying exclusionary relief to the vic-
tims of unlawful searches that are conducted in good faith 
while making clear that magistrate judges should have never 
issued a warrant for such searches in the first place. Or they 
can disaggregate the law more subtly, such as by defining 
rights in open-ended terms and then emphasizing deference to 
the substantive determinations of their lower-court counter-
parts. Either way, courts can confront the risk of vertical spill-
over by fashioning substantive holdings with limited preceden-
tial effects on lower-court adjudication. 
 
language “conveys an impression that the Court’s equal-protection analysis 
rested on partisan preferences rather than neutral principles”).  
 249. See discussion supra Part I.E. 
 250. See discussion supra Part I.D. 
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review, the more free the rein that lower courts receive to craft 
and apply the law as they see fit. And, while this free rein has 
the virtue of reducing spillover across remedies, it also has the 
vice of inhibiting higher courts’ abilities to monitor for errone-
ous applications of the law below. (The Gates standard, for in-
stance, may help to prevent rights-constricting forces of sup-
pression hearings from affecting the law that warrant-issuing 
magistrates apply, but it also means that magistrates need not 
worry too much about a reversal of their judgments in subse-
quent criminal proceedings.)251
How to balance these two conflicting interests is a difficult 
question. Its answer sometimes depends on empirical uncer-
tainties. For example, to what extent do trial and appellate 
judges actually suffer from hindsight bias when resolving 
Fourth Amendment claims? Recent empirical research suggests 
that judges may be more resistant to the bias than has general-
ly been supposed,
 Vertical disaggregation thus 
implicates a deep and inexorable tension between two conflict-
ing interests: (a) the interest in preventing remedy-based influ-
ences unique to higher-court review from constricting the sub-
stantive rules that lower courts apply, and (b) the interest in 
ensuring that lower courts’ application of the law is subject to 
meaningful supervision. 
252
Consequently, the case for disaggregation is more tentative 
as applied to vertical spillover than as applied to horizontal 
 in which case the Gates standard may re-
quire too much deference to magistrate-level probable cause de-
terminations. And, even if we could resolve all the empirical 
unknowns, the tradeoff may involve areas of deep normative 
disagreement: For instance, reducing appellate courts’ control 
over trial court-level review of structural errors disaggregates 
the law not just across the appellate-court/trial-court divide, 
but also among the many different trial courts within an appel-
late court’s jurisdiction. Similar litigants may receive varied 
judicial treatment, as different trial judges—lacking specific 
dictates from above—will end up applying different versions of 
the same substantive protections. The degree to which this out-
come strikes us as problematic—and hence, vertical disaggre-
gation as undesirable—will depend on nothing less fundamen-
tal than our sense of what it means to receive fair and equal 
treatment under the law. 
 
 251. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) (holding that magistrate 
determinations “should be paid great deference”). 
 252. See sources cited supra note 119. 
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spillover. Happily, though, the sensibility of the vertical dis-
aggregation strategy is a question that may itself be disaggre-
gated. We need not decide, once and for all, whether the costs of 
vertical disaggregation exceed its benefits. Rather, we may 
evaluate the strategy on a case-by-case basis, with due atten-
tion to the particular substantive norm at issue, as well as the 
particular remedial environments across which the disaggrega-
tion might occur. My hope is that the foregoing discussion, 
while not rendering a definitive verdict on the vertical dis-
aggregation strategy itself, at least identifies the criteria we 
should consult when determining whether to disaggregate 
across vertically situated remedies. 
  CONCLUSION   
The analysis I have offered may strike some readers as be-
ginning from a theoretically dubious premise. On a pragmatic 
conception of the law, there simply is no meaningful difference 
between rights and remedies—a right, in other words, counts 
for no more (and no less) than the bundle of remedies it allows 
one to invoke, and a remedy counts for no more (and no less) 
than the bundle of rights that it allows one to enforce.253
I take seriously the pragmatists’ notion that the 
right/remedy distinction may not be able to withstand serious 
theoretical scrutiny. For purposes of this project, however, the 
conceptual soundness of the right-remedy distinction is beside 
the point. Whatever its validity, the right-remedy distinction is 
one around which our doctrinal universe has been organized, 
and that organizational choice carries important real-world 
 At the 
end of the day, there are just litigants and judicial actors, and 
the law is nothing more than a means by which the former get 
the latter to do things on their behalf. What ultimately matters 
is the question of how the law—whether articulated in terms of 
“rights,” “remedies,” or both—permits courts to flex their mus-
cle against the outside world. Understood in this light, the en-
tire project of trying to respond to cross-remedial spillover 
within the substantive law might seem doomed from the start. 
For the project engages with a set of categories that are concep-
tually empty to begin with.  
 
 253. See Hills, supra note 233, at 179 (“Pragmatism maintains that there is 
no constitutional meaning apart from the actions that the relevant institution 
takes to enforce the Constitution.”); Levinson, supra note 8, at 858 (“There is 
no such thing as a constitutional right, at least not in the sense that courts 
and constitutional theorists often assume.”). 
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consequences for the actual content of the law. The pragmatist 
may be correct, in other words, to suggest that a well-
functioning body of law need not base itself around formally in-
dependent categories such as “rights” and “remedies,” and 
there may well exist more sensible ways of arranging and ex-
pressing the rules that govern the resolution of individual cas-
es. But when the law organizes itself around these categories, 
we must think carefully about the ways in which the arrange-
ment frustrates and facilitates the achievement of desirable ju-
dicial outcomes. Attending to the problem of spillover across 
remedies provides a means of doing just that.  
 
 
